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ABSTRACT
MASSACHUSETTS LANDOWNER PARTICIPATION IN
FOREST MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS FOR CARBON SEQUESTRATION:
AN ORDERED LOGIT ANALYSIS OF RATINGS DATA
MAY 2010
BRENTON J. DICKINSON, B.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
M.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Thomas H. Stevens

The Family Forest Research Center recently conducted a mail survey of about
1,400 Massachusetts landowners. Respondents were given questions about themselves
and their land and were then asked to rate three carbon sequestration programs in terms
of their likelihood to participate. An ordered logit model is used to estimate probabilities
that landowners would participate in various improved forest management programs.
There are several estimation issues to consider with the ordered logit model. The relative
merits of alternative models, including the multinomial and binomial logit, rank-ordered
logit, binary logit and mixed ordered logit are discussed.
Results of the ordered logit indicate that older males with less education and who
own less than 100 acres are less likely to participate in an improved forest management
program. All landowners are less likely to participate in a program that requires a
management plan and that has a lengthy time commitment, low revenue stream and early
withdrawal penalty. Policy implications and direction for future research are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO GLOBAL WARMING AND IMPROVED FOREST
MANAGEMENT
1.1 Background
Global warming is already affecting weather and other elements of our planet’s
ecosystem. Overwhelming scientific evidence indicates that the warming is largely
human caused. Burning of fossil fuels, other industrial processes and deforestation have
contributed to rising levels of atmospheric greenhouse gases (GHGs), which trap solar
energy in the earth’s atmosphere (Peschel, et al., 2007). According to the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the earth will experience regional warming,
changes in precipitation, extreme weather, more drought, earlier snowmelts, rising sea
levels, problems with water supply and other changes as a result of global warming over
the next several decades. Even If GHG emissions were completely halted today, the earth
would still warm for the next 100 years or so (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, 2007).
In the northeast US the average temperature has risen by 0.45 degrees Fahrenheit
per decade since 1970. Average annual precipitation in the northeast has seen a 0.4 inch
per year increase. Scientists project that by 2050, northeast summers will be two degrees
Fahrenheit warmer and winters four degrees warmer. More rain, heavier storms and even
drought caused by shifting precipitation timing are expected (Perschel, et al., 2007).
Many more effects have been documented both globally and locally, but will not be
covered here.
The solution to excessive GHGs lies not just in cutting back carbon emissions
from industry. Carbon emitters can buy time to develop greener technologies by
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offsetting emissions through the funding of emissions-reducing projects or carbon
sequestering activities elsewhere. Carbon emitters can arrange to capture methane
emitted from landfills and agriculture for use in energy production. Though carbon
dioxide is still released, atmospheric effects are far less than if the methane were allowed
to escape. Carbon emitters can also arrange to capture and recycle sulfur hexa-fluoride, a
powerful greenhouse gas emitted from electrical transformers. An end-use emissions
reduction offset is making non-power generation sources of carbon dioxide more
efficient, such as improving large buildings’ heating systems. Carbon emitters can even
plant trees to sequester carbon (Farnsworth, 2007). Another type of forestry-based offset
is improved forest management (IFM), which are explained below. The domain of this
paper is limited to IFM offsets. These other offset types will not be discussed further.
Forests naturally sequester carbon through the photosynthesis process. IFM
techniques have been developed to help forests sequester carbon more efficiently.
According to the US Forest Service, good forest management can double the quantity of
carbon sequestered (American Forest Foundation, 2009).
There are several distinct IFM techniques. The most basic type of IFM is the
implementation of low-impact logging in conventionally logged forests. In contrast to
conventional logging, low-impact logging involves more selectivity in harvesting trees.
Canals are not used to export the logs because they remove peat, thereby increasing
emissions of carbon dioxide. Skid trails are more carefully planned to reduce soil erosion.
Another type of IFM consists of simply converting currently logged forests into protected
forests. A third type involves allowing timber forests to grow longer before cutting.
Finally, forests that are not currently logged can be actively managed to improve carbon
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sequestration. The stocking of fast-growing trees in poorly stocked forests can increase
sequestration. The density of trees in a forest can be increased. In some cases,
fertilization and liming can greatly increase the carbon stock of a forest (Voluntary
Carbon Standard, 2007).
IFM offsets are potentially a substantial source of net carbon emissions reduction.
Ten percent of US carbon emissions are absorbed by America’s forests each year.
Around 35 percent of all the forestland in the US is family owned (American Forest
Foundation, 2009). US forest owners can play a significant role in climate change
mitigation through IFM.
There are several potential and actual opportunities for the US non-industrial
private forest (NIPF) owner to implement IFM techniques on his or her land and sell the
resulting carbon offsets. These include several current domestic cap and trade programs
including the California Climate Action Reserve, Western Climate Initiative, Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and a possible national cap and trade system currently moving
through Congress. Opportunities also exist in the form of the voluntary Chicago Climate
Exchange and over the counter offset markets.
1.2 Objectives
The purpose of this paper is to predict the probability that Massachusetts
landowners will participate in various hypothetical offset programs. A landowner survey
conducted by the Family Forest Research Center is used in conjunction with an ordered
logit discrete choice model to that end. Within the analysis, marginal probabilities for
individual characteristics and program attributes are also estimated. This information will
be invaluable to the policy maker invested in designing an optimal IFM offset program.
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A review of all relevant policies, programs and markets related to IFM offsets
follows in chapter 2. The Kyoto Protocol, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Western
Climate Initiative, California’s cap and trade program, a potential national cap and trade
program in the House and Senate climate bills and voluntary carbon markets are covered
therein. A literature review of studies investigating the likelihood of NIPF landowner
participation in carbon offset programs as well as a description of the landowner survey
used in this study follow in chapter 3. A consideration of several discrete choice model
candidates for analysis of the survey data and a theoretical framework for the ordered and
mixed ordered logistic models for use in the final analysis are presented in chapter 4.
Ordered logit regression results as well as predicted and marginal probabilities of
participation are discussed in chapter 5. In chapter 6, policy implications of these findings
are summarized and directions for future research are suggested. Chapter 7 summarizes
and concludes this paper.
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CHAPTER 2
POLICIES, PROGRAMS AND MARKETS: IFM OFFSET OVERVIEW
There are markets for buying and selling the carbon sequestration services that
IFM provides. Some of these markets are the result of cap and trade programs while other
markets are strictly voluntary. There are several programs designed specifically to
encourage participation of the American NIPF landowner. The purpose of this chapter is
first to determine the offset markets and any other carbon sequestration programs that are
relevant to the Massachusetts NIPF landowner. The other motivation is to establish a list
of program or policy parameters that a prospective participant is likely to face.
All markets and programs with potential and actual relevance to the
Massachusetts NIPF landowner are detailed below. Cap and trade programs, voluntary
offset markets and the Chapter 61B current tax use program are considered. A literature
review of the topic of landowner participation in carbon sequestration programs follows.
Finally, a summary of the relevant programs associated parameters of involvement is
presented.
2.1 Cap and Trade Programs
A carbon cap and trade program consists of two parts. First, the government
decides a cap – a maximum allowable quantity of emissions units. Second, carbon
emitters included in the program are allowed to trade emissions unit permits. That way,
an emitter who has a higher cost associated with reducing emissions can buy permits
from an emitter with lower costs of emissions reduction. Some cap and trade programs
also allow carbon emitters to count offsets – created through the funding of projects and
activities that reduce atmospheric carbon – toward the emissions reduction target.
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International and domestic cap and trade programs are described below in terms of their
use or non-use of IFM offsets and their relevance to the NIPF landowner.
2.1.1 Kyoto Protocol and Copenhagen Accord
The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement that sets binding carbon
emissions reduction targets for 37 developed nations. The US has not signed on.
Reduction targets average five percent lower than 1990 levels, to be achieved between
2008 and 2012 (United Nations, 1998). The Protocol is a cap and trade program wherein
countries and industries can sell carbon allowances if they surpass their target and buy
allowances if they struggle to meet it. One of the flexibility mechanisms designed to
make this process as cost-effective as possible is the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM). The CDM allows an industrialized country trying to use emissions reductions
from an approved green development project in a developing nation toward its own
emissions target. The only forestry projects allowed are reforestation and afforestation
(United Nations, 1998). The Kyoto Protocol therefore has no relevance to IFM projects at
all.
The Copenhagen Accord is a far less detailed international agreement on climate
change. The Accord does not set any legally binding emissions reductions targets for any
country. It is immaterial to IMF offset markets as well (Copenhagen, 2009).
2.1.2 California Climate Action Reserve
Several domestic cap and trade programs have been or are being established.
California has a cap and trade program, the California Climate Action Reserve (CAR),
that allows for limited IFM offsets. The California Air Resources Board recently
developed protocols for trading IFM offsets as directed by SB 812. Currently California
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has three such pilot projects in operation. They are large in scale and government
administered (Nickerson, 2008). At present, the CAR program is not relevant to NIPF
landowners.
2.1.3 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
Ten northeast states have signed onto the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI), a regional cap and trade program. The program is operational as of 2009. It aims
to stabilize carbon emissions between 2009 and 2015 and to reduce emissions by 10
percent by 2019. RGGI currently does not allow for IFM offsets. However, the Post
Model Rule Action Plan leaves room for additional sources of offsets, including IFM, to
become eligible later (Perschel, et al., 2007). RGGI is not currently relevant to the NIPF
landowner
2.1.4 Western Climate Initiative
The Western Climate Initiative is another regional cap and trade system,
developed in 2007. It involves California, Washington, Oregon, New Mexico, Arizona,
Utah, Manitoba and British Columbia. The goal of the program is to reduce carbon
emissions to 15 percent lower than 2005 levels by 2020 (Perschel, et al., 2007).
Carbon offset rules are still being developed. It is known only that offsets will be
limited to 49 percent of total emissions reduction targets. Whether or not IFM offsets will
be allowed is unclear at this time (WCI Recommendations, 2010).
2.1.5 Possible National Cap and Trade System
In 2009, the U.S. House passed the Waxman-Markey bill, also called the
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009. The legislation outlines a national cap
and trade system that includes liberal use of offsets. IFM is eligible for use in the offset
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market, but regulations regarding specific programs are not explicit. Relevance to NIPF
landowners is uncertain. The EPA, in cooperation with a specially assigned committee,
will determine eligible offset programs over the two years following passage of a final
bill (American Clean Energy and Security Act, 2009).
The Senate is currently debating the Kerry-Boxer bill, officially known as the
Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, which closely mirrors the House version
(U.S. Climate Legislation, 2009). There are many reasons to expect IFM offsets to play a
significant role in the final legislation. The US Environmental Protection Agency (2009)
projects that 81 percent of domestic offsets for the beginning years of this cap and trade
program will need to come from forestry offsets.
A study by the Congressional Budget Office predicts that demand will outstrip
supply of offsets in the early years of the cap and trade program. If that happens, offset
prices will likely be high (Congressional Budget Office, 2009). The language of the two
climate bills indicates that offsets already purchased voluntarily or as part of a regional
cap and trade program will be eligible for use in the new cap and trade system.
Consequently, demand for offsets from groups like New Forests – a company that
evaluates and implements forest carbon offset projects – has risen dramatically (U.S.
Climate Legislation, 2009).
At present, this national cap and trade program does not represent an opportunity
for the NIPF landowner to sell IFM offsets, but may soon. Both the House and Senate
bills set aside two billion annual tons of carbon emissions reduction to come from offsets
(one billion domestic and one billion international). IFM will likely be an acceptable
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source of offsets. In that scenario, it is easy to imagine a role for the NIPF landowner
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2009).
2.2 Voluntary Carbon Offset Markets
Cap and trade programs can create offset markets driven by the need of carbon
emitters to find cheaper ways to reduce net emissions. There are also voluntary carbon
offset markets driven by the desire of anyone wanting to buy or sell carbon offsets
created by various projects and activities. Buyers and sellers can be individual people or
large firms. There are two voluntary markets in the U.S. These are described below in
terms of their relevance to the NIPF landowner.
2.2.1 Chicago Climate Exchange
The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) is a rules-based voluntary carbon offset
market. It allows and has specific protocols for IFM offsets. The CCX is currently
developing a California Climate Exchange, a New York Climate Exchange and a
Northeast Climate Exchange for trading offsets in regional cap and trade programs
(Chicago Climate Exchange, 2007).
Costs of getting certified and meeting other requirements are too high at the
individual family forest scale for the NIPF landowner to sell IFM offsets on the CCX.
There are several offset aggregation programs around the country designed to create the
economies of scale necessary to sell on the CCX by pooling the IFM offsets of NIPF
landowners. These programs are jointly run by state government agencies and private
forestry companies. The parameters of involvement in these programs are detailed below.
An apparently successful example is a pilot program called the Michigan
Working Forest Carbon Offset Program (MWFCOP). The non-profit Delta Institute
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aggregates credits from many small landowners and trades with the CCX. Landowners
are annually paid the net revenues from their credits after accounting for aggregation and
trading fees. Fees include a $0.20/ton of carbon credits earned and a ten percent charge
on gross carbon revenues (Delta Institute, 2009).
In accordance with CCX protocol, landowners are not paid for 20 percent of
estimated carbon sequestration as insurance against harvest or catastrophic loss. Each
year, that 20 percent goes into a reserve pool. If by 2010 the reserve pool is positive, the
landowner can sell the credits. If by that year the reserve pool is negative, the landowner
is required to purchase credits to make up the difference. If the forest landowner does not
comply with the prescribed sustainable forestry management plan, he or she must return
the carbon credits earned during the project years, and may also be permanently banned
from participation in the CCX. The landowner can cancel the contract if the Delta
Institute agrees to it. For a fee, the Michigan DNR can provide landowners with technical
assistance in assessing carbon stocks, etc (Delta Institute, 2009).
To be eligible, a working forest must be actively managed and enrolled in a forest
stewardship program through a prescribed list of organizations, including the Sustainable
Forestry Initiative. In order to participate in the MWFCOP, the landowner must establish
a baseline inventory of the carbon stock, report annual changes from harvesting or
weather damage, be verified annually by a CCX-approved third party, and write a letter
indicating commitment to an approved forest management plan (Delta Institute).
Landowners recently enjoyed an $8 per acre return (Oregon Small Woodlands
Association, 2009).
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Inspired by the success of the Michigan pilot program, two other programs in that
region have emerged. One is the Michigan Conservation and Climate initiative, and the
other is the Illinois Conservation and Climate Initiative. The requirements for
participation, fees and costs associated with these programs are identical to the Michigan
pilot project (Michigan Conservation & Climate Initiative, 2010).
A similar program is operating in the Western United States. Woodlands Carbon,
a corporation formed in 2008 by the Oregon Small Woods Association (OSWA) and the
American Forest Foundation (AFF), aggregates and trades offset credits from NIPF
landowners on the CCX. Contracts with Woodlands Carbon last 15 years. As with the
Michigan program, 20 percent of credits earned must be set aside as insurance. Up to an
additional 10 percent may be deducted to account for error in sequestration estimation.
Liability from catastrophic weather is limited to 20 percent of carbon credits; the 20
percent can be sold at the end of a market period if it is not lost (Oregon Small
Woodlands Association, 2009).
Startup costs for a prospective participant include the cost of certifying the land,
unless the landowner is already certified by an approved organization. Woodlands
Carbon offers loans for certification costs, eliminating the need for out-of-pocket
expenditure. The required OSWA membership costs $135 for owners of more than 70
acres and $85 for owners of less than 70 acres. Woodlands Carbon charges a percentage
of carbon revenues for aggregation and trading services. There are financial penalties for
non-compliance with the contract. In accordance with CCX protocol, all forestland
owned by an individual must be enrolled. Thus, a landowner cannot set aside some of his
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land for timber and other land for carbon credits (Oregon Small Woodlands Association,
2009).
To be eligible, the land must meet certain productivity and inventory
requirements. Any acreage is eligible, but plots of less than 100 acres are not likely to be
profitable. One person needs to be authorized to make decisions regarding forest
management. The forest owner needs to be enrolled in the American Tree Farm System
and must maintain Tree Farm Certification for 15 years from the time the contract with
Woodlands Carbon begins. The owner needs to be a member in good standing with
OSWA for the 15 year contract. The owner must inventory carbon stocks in accordance
with CCX protocol and present the data in the approved Woodlands Carbon format
annually. Any timber sales contracts by the owner must include a stipulation maintaining
ownership of the carbon stored in the timber. Audits are infrequent but may happen at
any time (Oregon Small Woodlands Association, 2009).
A Northeast pilot project is also under way. CarbonTree, LLC was formed by the
Empire State Forest Products Association (ESFPA) and the American Forest Foundation
to aggregate and trade sequestered carbon offsets on behalf of private Northeast forest
landowners. The structure of the program is nearly identical to that administered by
Woodlands Carbon. ESFPA membership is required. It costs $120 per year for owners of
more than 500 acres and $60 per year for those owning less. Excluding certification and
annual verification costs, CarbonTree charges 12 percent of all sales. The same eligibility
requirements apply as with Woodlands Carbon (CarbonTree, 2009).
In short, the parameters of participating in these aggregation programs are fairly
consistent. A prospective participant must be willing to sign a 15 year contract and file a
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management plan. The participant usually will face penalties for breaking the contract. If
the Michigan pilot program is a good indicator, it is only worth participating for
landowners with over 100 acres. Landowners can expect around $8 per acre per year.
2.2.2 Over the Counter Markets
While the CCX is a centralized, closely monitored rules-based market, over the
counter (OTC) markets do not operate under any required set of protocols. OTC markets
are not bound by any rules whatsoever. OTC market interactions can be as simple as a
single project developer selling his offset credit to a single willing buyer or as
complicated as an aggregator buying from many projects and selling wholesale to a
retailer, who then sells the offsets to willing buyers (Hamilton, et al., 2008).
To make trades more transparent and credible, most forestry offset sellers obtain
certification through one of several common standards. The most popular standards used
by offset suppliers in early 2008 were the Voluntary Carbon Standard, the Gold Standard,
the VER+, and the Climate, Community and Biodiversity (CCB) Standard. There are
several purposes that a standard can serve: accounting standards, monitoring, verification
and certification standards, and registration and enforcement systems. Some standards,
known as full-fledged carbon offset standards, serve all of these functions. VCS, the Gold
Standard, and the VER+ are full-fledged standards, while the CCB is a project design
standard (Kolmuss, et al., 2008). The Gold Standard does not cover IFM projects, so is
not described in detail here. As the CCB standard is not comprehensive, it is not covered
here either. Below is a brief description of the requirements of the VCS and VER+
standards.
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The VCS does cover IFM projects, provided that they are not earning some other
type of environmental credit elsewhere. There are no restrictions on project size or
location, though a “micro” project is defined as one that offsets under 5,000 tons of
carbon per year. There are comprehensive additionality and baseline requirements.
Projects are required to be above and beyond any regulation – they must be proven to be
totally voluntary. The crediting period of VCS projects is 10 years. There is a registration
fee for each Voluntary Carbon Unit (VCU) accredited of four euro cents. Additional
account fees are set by the VCS approved registries (Kolmuss, et al., 2008).
The VER+ standard also includes rules for IFM offset projects. There are no size
restrictions on VER+ projects. Additionality and baseline methodologies are developed
on a project by project basis. Verification and registration of projects is conducted by an
accredited auditor and is based on validation reports of the project developer. Verification
fees depend on the rates of VER+ approved auditors, but range between 5,000 and 15,000
Euros. Registration fees range between 1,500 and 3,000 Euros (Kolmuss, et al., 2008).
There are many opportunities for large carbon emitters (or anyone else) to offset
their emissions using the voluntary market standards detailed above. There are equally
many opportunities for large-scale retailing of carbon offsets through IFM projects. As
with the CCX, the individual NIPF landowner cannot sell certified IFM offsets on OTC
markets because of the high startup costs. There are offset aggregators for voluntary
markets, including New Forests and Forecon. However, these aggregators are not geared
toward the NIPF landowner. The voluntary market is irrelevant to the NIPF landowner at
the present time.
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2.3 Chapter 61B
In Massachusetts, there are three current use tax programs. Landowners can enjoy
reduced property taxes for restricting the use of the their land to a specific purpose. The
Chapter 61B program in particular provides substantial tax incentives in return for
providing wildlife habitat and local timber products. The program is covered here
because it can be considered as a non-market carbon sequestration program that does not
require participants to file a management plan, has a minimal time commitment, high
revenue and a penalty for early withdrawal.
To be eligible to participate, the landowner must have at least 5 acres, excluding
residence and other buildings. Land use is restricted to either open space or recreation.
Open space means land retained in a substantially natural, wild, or open condition; land
retained in a landscaped or pasture condition; or managed forest under a state-approved
forest management plan. Public access is not required for open space use. Recreation
means land that is available for recreational purposes that do not harm the environment.
Under the recreation category, the land must be accessible to the public or to members of
a nonprofit organization. The landowner is permitted to charge an access fee.
The landowner is not required to file a management plan with the state unless he
or she plans to harvest timber. Harvesting timber on Chapter 61B land is allowed
provided the landowner files an approved management plan. If the landowner changes
use of the land within five years of enrolling in the program, there is an early withdrawal
penalty consisting of back taxes. Should the landowner sell the property for a change in
use within ten years of enrolling, the back tax penalty also applies. After those times, no
early withdrawal penalties will be incurred.
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If the landowner sells the property for residential, commercial, or industrial use
while enrolled in Chapter 61B or within a year of leaving the program, the town has the
right to match any offer for the land and purchase it. There is no fee charged to the
landowner to enroll or to transfer land use to another Chapter 61 program. The value of
the land is determined by its recreational use value. Non-eligible sections of the land are
taxed at normal rates (Chapter 61B).
2.4 Summary
There are only a few opportunities for the NIPF landowner to sell IFM offsets. All
of the cap and trade programs mentioned either do not allow IFM offsets or are not
geared toward NIPF landowners. However, new climate legislation could change that if
the Senate bill is passed. NIPF landowners may be able to sell IFM offsets in a national
cap and trade system.
Over the counter offset markets are also inaccessible to the NIPF landowner. The
economy of scale is too small at the individual small landowner level. Startup costs and
fees are too high for selling IFM offsets to be profitable.
The only offset programs geared specifically toward the small forest owner
consist of IFM offset aggregation for the CCX. These programs generally require
participants to file a management plan, have a 15 year time commitment, $8 per acre
annual revenue and an early withdrawal penalty. Only one of these programs – the New
York based CarbonTree – is accessible to the Massachusetts NIPF landowner.
There is also a land use tax program in Massachusetts that resembles a carbon
sequestration incentive program. Though carbon sequestration is not the explicit goal of
Chapter 61B, the program can be considered a relatively unrestrictive, high-revenue
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incentive program for carbon sequestration. This program does not require participants to
file a management plan unless the participant plans to harvest timber, has a minimal time
commitment, and no early withdrawal penalty in most circumstances. The tax savings can
be quite substantial, translating into a much higher revenue than the CCX-based
programs.
In the next chapter, the available literature about landowner participation in
carbon sequestration programs is reviewed. A survey of Massachusetts landowners
designed to assess likelihood of their participation in such programs is summarized.
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CHAPTER 3
HOW LIKELY ARE NIPF LANDOWNERS TO PARTICIPATE IN CARBON
MARKETS?
The literature regarding NIPF landowner participation in carbon markets is
extremely sparse. What little information is available in the literature until now is
presented below. Following that is a description of the landowner survey used in the
present study. This survey was designed with the intention of gaining a better
understanding of Massachusetts landowner attitudes toward participation in carbon
markets.
3.1 The Literature
There is very little information available about the likelihood that NIPF
landowners will participate in IFM offset markets. To the author’s knowledge, there is
only one study that investigates the topic quantitatively. The available literature is
summarized below.
Cason, et al. (2006) promote the use of university extensions in convincing and
helping NIPF landowners to participate carbon sequestration programs in the American
southeast. The authors present a qualitative discussion of carbon sequestration easement
programs in Mississippi but do not provide a quantitative analysis of the likelihood of
landowner participation.
The only study at present to have explicitly analyzed the likelihood of NIPF
landowner participation in carbon offset markets is a pilot study conducted by Fletcher, et
al. (2009). The authors present IFM offset programs like the CCX aggregation programs
detailed in chapter 2 to a focus group of Massachusetts landowners. Participants are
asked to rate six programs each on a scale of 1 to 10, where a 10 represents absolute
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certainly that the landowner will participate in the program. Program attribute variables
include whether or not an official management plan must be filed, per acre annual
revenue from the carbon offsets ($5, $15 and $30), time commitment (five or ten years)
and whether or not there is a penalty for early withdrawal from the program.
The authors use a tobit model to estimate the effect of program attributes on rating
level and a logit model to estimate landowners’ willingness to sell carbon offsets. To
render the ratings data usable for the logit model, the authors code a 1-8 rating as a “no”
and a 9 or 10 rating as a “yes.” Socioeconomic variables were excluded from the final
model due to insignificance of the parameter estimates. However, the authors caution that
the insignificance is likely a result of such a limited sample size (only 17 landowners).
They note that previous research demonstrates the importance of landowners’
characteristics in determining their responses to other types of management programs
(Finley and Kittridge, 2006).
Tobit results indicate that that landowners give higher ratings to programs that do
not require a management plan, have higher revenue stream, and do not have an early
withdrawal penalty. Surprisingly, a higher time commitment leads to a higher rating.
there is no penalty for early withdrawal.
Logit results suggest that only five percent of landowners would participate at an
annual per acre payment of $15 where other attributes are held constant at their means.
About 13 percent would take part in a program with a $30 per acre per year payment and
33 percent would participate where the per acre annual revenue is $50. The authors note
that at the current carbon price of $6 per ton on the CCX, an average Massachusetts
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forest that sequesters one to three tons per year translates to an annual per acre revenue of
$6 to $18.
3.2 A Massachusetts Landowner Survey
Massachusetts can and should play a role in climate mitigation; about 62% of its
land is forested. Furthermore, 235,000 private individuals own 78% of that land (Alerich,
2000). To assess the feasibility of a carbon sequestration program in this state, it is
critical to understand how these landowners feel about enrolling their land in various
hypothetical programs.
To that end, the Family Forest Research Center recently conducted a mail survey
of Massachusetts landowners with funding from the Massachusetts Agricultural
Experiment Station and UMass Extension. An unusually high response rate of around
50% was achieved (The Potential for Carbon Sequestration on Family Forest Land,
2010). However, of the 1,403 returned surveys, only 910 were complete.
Respondents answered questions about themselves and their land and then were
asked to rate, on a scale of 1 to 10, three different hypothetical carbon sequestration
programs. The rating question was worded such that a 10 should indicate absolute
certainty on the part of the landowner that he or she would participate in the program
given the opportunity, while a 1 should indicate absolute certainty of the opposite. Any
rating in the middle should indicate varying levels of uncertainty on the part of the
landowner. Prior to the rating questions, respondents were asked to read about a page of
background information on CCX aggregator programs so they could understand what
they were rating. This information is included in Appendix C.
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The programs varied along the following lines: whether or not a management plan
is required of the landowner, how long is the time commitment, what is the per-acre net
revenue, and whether or not there is a penalty for early withdrawal from the program.
These four attributes were used because they are representative of the parameters of
involvement of the CCX aggregation programs and Chapter 61B described in chapter 2.
There were four versions of the survey, each with a distinct set of three programs.
Thus, there are 12 distinct programs with ratings data for each. The levels and attributes
associated with each program are listed in table 1 below. This table is also in appendix A
for reference.
Table 1: Attributes and Levels for Each of the 12 Programs
Version 1
Version 2
Version 3
P1
P2
P3
P1
P2
P3
P1
P2
P3
Attr.
No
no
No
no
no
no
yes Yes yes
Plan
5
10
10
5
5
10
5
10
10
Time
15
5
30
5
30
15
15
5
30
Rev.
No
no Yes no
yes yes
no Yes no
Pen.
Plan: Management plan required?
Time: Time commitment, in years.
Rev.: Expected per-acre revenue, net of all costs ($)
Pen.: Penalty for early withdrawal?

Version 4
P1
P2
P3
yes Yes yes
5
5
10
5
30
15
yes No yes

A fractional factorial design was used to decide attribute levels for each program.
Care was taken to avoid dominant or reverse-dominant programs that all respondents
would likely rate 10 or 1, respectively. For example, a program with no required
management plan, minimal time commitment, high revenue stream and no early
withdrawal penalty would be a dominant program. A reverse-dominant program would
include a required management plan, high time commitment, low revenue and a penalty
for early withdrawal. Such universally popular or unpopular programs would not yield
information about the tradeoffs landowners make when considering program attributes.
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Individual characteristics obtained from the survey and used for analysis include
acres owned, age, level of education and gender. Many more attitudinal questions were
asked in the survey but are not included for this analysis. The characteristics used in this
study and their associated variable names are listed in table 2 below and are also listed in
appendix B.
Table 2: Explanation of Variables Used
Plan: Management plan required is a 1; not required is a 0.
Time: Time commitment, in years. Takes on values of 5,10, and 15 years.
Rev: Revenue net of costs, in dollars per acre per year. Takes on values of 5, 15, and 30
dollars per acre per year.
Pen: Penalty for early withdrawal is a 1; no penalty is a 0.
Acre: Respondent owns 100 acres or more is a 1; fewer than 100 acres is a 0.
Older: Respondent is 66 years or older in age takes a 1; younger than 66 takes a 0.
LowerEd: Respondent’s education level is high school diploma or less takes a 1; some
college or more takes a 0.
HigherEd: Respondent has more than a college degree is a 1;
a college degree or less is a 0.
Male: Respondent is male takes a 1; female takes a 0.
Plan*Older: 1 if management plan is required and respondent is 66 years or older; else 0.
Rev*Older: Revenue for respondents 66 and older.
Plan*LowerEd: 1 if management plan is required and respondent has a high school
diploma or less; else 0.
Rev*LowerEd: Revenue for respondents with a high school diploma or less.
Time*Male: Time commitment for males.

In the survey, respondents were asked to indicate their age by checking one of
five age categories. These were condensed into just two categories for the analysis.
Similarly, there were five categories of education in the survey. These were condensed
into three categories. The survey asked respondents to indicate how many acres they own
with an open-ended question. Those numbers were converted to a dummy variable
indicating more than 100 acres for the analysis.
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3.3 Summary
There is almost no literature on the likelihood that NIPF landowners will
participate in carbon offset markets. The one study that explicitly investigates the topic is
limited in scope; it is a pilot study of Massachusetts NIPF landowners. The study’s
authors find low probabilities of Vermont and Massachusetts landowner participation in
CCX aggregation programs. They conclude that landowners give lower ratings to
programs that require them to file a management plan and have a penalty for early
withdrawal. Landowners give higher ratings where revenue and time commitment are
greater. Individual characteristics are insignificant as independent variables. These
conclusions are tempered with the warning that they are based on a small, non-random
sample. The present research is largely inspired and informed by that study. The mail
survey of Massachusetts landowners conducted by the Family Forest Research Center is
used to answer the question of how likely landowners are to participate in carbon
sequestration programs.
Econometric methodology for analyzing the survey data are detailed in the next
chapter. Several possible discrete choice models are considered. The ordered and mixed
ordered logit models are described in detail. Estimation pitfalls are discussed.

23

CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY
4.1 The Most Common Choice Models
There is a great number of possible discrete choice models available to the
researcher. The models considered for this analysis are briefly outlined for the purpose of
emphasizing a few of the many considerations the researcher has to make in choosing a
model. Included in the discussion are the linear and tobit, multinomial logit, censored
rank-ordered logit, binomial and binomial logit, and ordered and mixed ordered logit
models. The ordered and mixed ordered logit are shown to comprise the best approach; as
such, they are covered in detail. Estimation problems with the ordered models are
discussed as well.
4.1.1 Linear and Tobit
The linear and tobit models were immediately discarded as possibilities. The
ratings data are ordinal, but not interval. The difference between moving from a 2 to a 3
does not necessarily have the same meaning as moving from a 9 to a 10. Interpretation of
linear and tobit regression results is therefore not possible. Furthermore, probabilities of
participation cannot be obtained (Borooah, 2002).
4.1.2 The Multinomial Logit
The multinomial logit (MNL) is based on random utility theory of consumer
behavior. Choices made by a decision maker are modeled as follows. A decision maker
with a vector of characteristics chooses from a set of discreet choices, each assigned a
probability of selection. Each alternative comprises a vector of attributes.
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Utility derived from a given alternative is assumed to be a linear function of two
components, one deterministic one random. The deterministic component of utility is a
function of individual characteristics and alternative attributes. The random component
results from the researcher’s inability to observe all the attributes of the decision maker
and not from actual random utility (Hensher, et al., 2000). This component is assumed to
follow the logistic distribution. Thus, individual choice, described completely by varying
levels of common attributes like socioeconomic background and a set of alternatives, is
defined as a draw from a multinomial distribution with selection probabilities.
Two major assumptions must be made to render the model operational. The first
assumption is known as the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives Axiom, and posits
that ratio of probabilities of choosing one alternative over another is unaffected by the
presence or absence of other alternatives in the choice set. There are tests to establish
whether this is reasonable or not for a given study (Hensher, et al., 2000). The second
assumption is that the choice set covers all relevant alternatives, so that respondents
consider only the alternatives presented in the survey (DeShazo, et al., 2009).
A MNL model is theoretically possible for use with this data set. To convert the
program ratings into choice data, the highest rating of the three programs would be coded
as a 1, indicating a “yes,” while the other two programs would be coded as zeros, or
“no’s”. There are several critical flaws in this approach.
As mentioned above, a basic assumption of the MNL is that the choice set facing
respondents is complete. There is no exit option in the survey question. Respondents
were not asked to rate the status quo as an alternative. Another major problem is that the
highest rating might be a 2 or 3. To code that as a “yes” is not reasonable. Even if it
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were, there is a more practical concern. A substantial portion of respondents (30 percent)
chose the same rating for all three programs. Those respondents would have to be
trimmed from the model.
A related model, the censored rank-ordered logit, is outlined by Layton and Lee
(2006). This involves converting ratings into rankings. The authors point out that tied
ratings do not necessarily indicate indifference, but might mean instead that the scale is
not large enough. For example, an apparent tie on a Likert scale of 1-10 might disappear
on a scale of 1-100 – a 9 versus 9 might become 92 versus 97. Thus ties are censored
from the model. However, this approach is discarded because 30 percent of respondents
rated their three programs the same and would have to be censored.
4.1.3 The Binomial Logit
A special case of the MNL is also considered – the binomial logit model. Each
rating can be viewed as a choice between the status quo (doing nothing) and the program.
Following Fletcher, et al. (2009), the ratings could be recoded to fit that type of choice. A
slightly more conservative coding than that used by Fletcher, et al. involves coding a10 –
indicating certainty of participation – as a yes (to the program). A 1-9 could be coded as a
no. The no to the program is taken as a yes to the status quo.
Each individual’s three ratings could be viewed as three binomial choices
between the program and the status quo. However, there is no reasonable way to
parameterize the status quo for each individual. The status quo could involve selling
timber, enrolling in a conservation program, or just passively enjoying the land.
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4.1.4 The Binary Logit
The binary logit is more feasible. As with the binomial approach, a10 is coded as
a 1 (yes) while a 1-9 is coded as a 0 (no). The probability of a yes is modeled without
consideration of alternatives (Borooah, 2001).
There is evidence that certainty on a Likert scale closely resembles an actual
“yes” in the real world (Stevens, et al., 2000), yet the binary logit is not the best option.
The data are ordinal in nature, not binary. Coding the data as mentioned entails ignoring
any behavior in the 1 to 9 category and prevents analysis of the lower ratings.
Furthermore, insignificance of important variables is likely because of the lack of
variation in the binary-coded data. That happens with the binary coding of ratings data by
Fletcher, et al. (2009).
None of the models presented thus far are adequate for the data at hand. A more
appropriate model, the ordered logit, accounts for the ordinal nature of the ratings data.
This model is used in the final analysis and is detailed in the next section.
4.2 The Ordered Logit : A Model Suited for Ratings Data
The ordered logit model, also known as the cumulative logistic model, fits the
dataset best. Note that the ordered probit model was discarded because of a paper by
Kropoko (2008), who conducts a comprehensive set of simulations showing that the
probit generally results in significantly more biased estimates than the logit.
4.2.1 Model Setup
The ordered logit is related to the latent class model. An unobserved (latent)
dependent variable is a function of observed and unobserved variables:
     ′ 
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Note that r* is an unobserved, continuous, underlying tendency behind the observed
ordinal response (rating). The X’s represent individual characteristics and program
attributes, while the β’s represent the associated parameters. The error term captures
stochastic (unobserved) variation. It is assumed to be distributed logistically.
What we do observe is:
 1     
 2       
…
 10     
where R is the rating and the µ’s represent thresholds of y* that delineate the categories
of the ordered response variable. These threshold parameters are restricted to be positive
where each one is greater than the previous. The first parameter µ 1 is normalized to 0 so
that one less parameter has to be estimated. That is not a problem because the scale of the
latent variable is arbitrary (Borooah, 2001).
Thus the cumulative probability of choosing a particular rating or lower is found
using the logistic cumulative density function
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which can be expressed more simply as
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Probabilities of lower ratings are subtracted from the cumulative probability of the rating
of interest to find its probability of occurrence. This is shown below for the specific
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rating values (Liao 1994). Note that F() is the logistic cumulative density function,
defined above.
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The likelihood of having observed the sample choices is therefore:
+  ,  1-./ ,  2-.0 … ,  10-./1
where the N’s represent number of respondents in the sample who selected the
corresponding rating. To obtain estimates for the regression coefficients and latent
variable cutpoints, the log of the likelihood function
++   N3  ln ,  is maximized with respect to the coefficients and cutpoints.
4.2.2 How to Interpret an Ordered Logit Model
There are three steps for interpreting the results of an ordered logit model. The
first step (and least intuitive) is to look at the marginal effect of a change in X on the odds
ratio
  |
 exp 
1   |

   

The coefficients in the regression results represent the marginal effect of a change in X
on the log-odds. The effect on the odds ratio (given that the other independent variables
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are held constant at their means and/or modes) is obtained simply by exponentiating the
parameter estimate. Thus, the exponentiated coefficient is the effect that a one unit
increase in the independent variable has on the odds ratio of the individual choosing one
rating over all the other ratings (Liao 1994).
A more sensible interpretation of the regression output involves predicting the
probabilities for each category of the dependent variable at the means of the independent
variables. To get those probabilities, all that is necessary is to plug the coefficients and X
means into the equations below:
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A finer analysis of the predicted probabilities is possible. Probabilities for each
category at each level of a particular independent variable can be predicted. The other
independent variables will of course be held at their means.
Additionally, estimated marginal effects of independent variables on the
probabilities of being in each category can be calculated. Differentiating the above set of
equations with respect to xk yields
7  
 ,&
7
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With dummy variables, this differentiation method will lead to biased results. A better
way to get the marginal effect for a dummy variable is to calculate the probabilities for
each category at X=0 and at X=1, and take the difference. While the bias will not be
substantial enough to effect broad conclusions, it will mire a finer analysis (Liao 1994).
4.3 Possible Problems with the Standard Ordered Logit
Though the ordered logit model is much better suited for ratings data than the
models listed in the first section, it is not totally ideal. There are still potential sources of
bias and other estimation problems. These are described in the sections below.
4.3.1 Choice Task Complexity and Protest
Though the ordered logit is considered the best possible model for this dataset,
several caveats must be offered before estimation. There is ample research indicating that
choice complexity and protest attitudes can affect consistency of regression results.
Moon (2004) shows that higher choice complexity leads to a higher likelihood of
choosing the status quo alternative, suggesting that respondents choose the status quo
because it is easiest to understand. For the survey in the present study, that problem
would likely manifest itself in lower ratings among people who have difficulty
understanding the programs. Adamowicz, von Haefen and Massey (2005) deal with serial
nonparticipation – protest against the tradeoffs presented or suggested in the survey, or
against all government action. These authors suggest that protest attitudes in the
respondents can bias results because the choice selections are not sincere.
DeShazo and Fermo (2002) develop five measures of choice task complexity in
determining whether it is a problem with respect to consistency of estimation results.
They too find a serious complexity effect, but offer a couple of solutions to deal with it.
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They suggest that there are two stages in the experimental process where researchers can
intervene to mitigate the complexity effect. First, researchers should choose the optimal
number (identified via pre-testing) of alternatives, being careful about attribute
correlation structures. Second, researchers can deal with complexity issues using a
heteroskedastic logit model at the estimation stage (this requires non-constant complexity
throughout sample).
Of the 1,403 completed surveys in the present study, 493 did not contain any
ratings data for the programs – respondents simply left that section blank. If the reason
was choice task complexity or protest attitudes, there is a possibility of bias in using only
the 910 completed surveys. The bias mitigation measures detailed in this section are
unfortunately not possible for this study as the survey is already completed.
4.3.2 Hypothetical Bias
Hypothetical bias is a well-documented problem in stated preference studies.
Participants often overstate willingness to pay for goods in the absence of a real-world
budget constraint (Brown, et al., 2003). The problem of course can manifest itself in
hypothetical willingness to accept as well. The present study includes willingness to
accept measures in the per acre annual revenue variable. If NIPF landowners’ choices in
the survey differ from what their choices would be in the real world because of the
hypothetical nature of the revenue variable, estimates of the effect of per acre annual
revenue will be biased.
Murphy, et al., (2005) conduct a meta analysis of stated preference studies – that
elicit both hypothetical and real willingness to pay – in order to determine the magnitude
of hypothetical bias and its underlying causes. They find an average ratio of hypothetical
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to real values of 2.35 and a median of only 1.35. The ten highest ratios averaged 10.3,
indicating an extreme right skew. Thus hypothetical bias may not be such a serious
problem in many studies.
Murphy, el al. investigate the factors behind hypothetical bias using a log-log
model with natural log of actual value as the dependent variable. On the right hand side
are natural log of hypothetical value and square of hypothetical value, along with several
dummy variables. The authors conclude that greater bias results from higher stated
hypothetical values, and that the relationship is positively quadratic. They determine that
conducting studies using students and in group settings leads to greater hypothetical bias,
but the student effect could not be extracted from the group effect.
The last significant result of these authors’ work is that studies employing
dichotomous/polychotomous choice, referendum, payment card and conjoint choice
elicitation methods yield lower hypothetical bias than pricing elicitation methods. Several
other variables, including whether a private good is involved, whether the comparison is
within-group, and whether a calibration technique such as budget reminders or “cheap
talk” is used, are included in the model. However, the significance of these factors
depends on model specification. The authors recommend against focusing on these
individually, though as a whole they explain a significant portion of variation between
studies (Murphy, et al, 2005).
There is evidence that asking (but not requiring) participants to sign an oath to
respond honestly substantially reduces hypothetical bias in stated preference studies.
Economic literature is sparse in the area of oath-taking. Shogren, et al. (2009), use
psychology literature to inform their exploration of preference elicitation under oath.
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Commitment theory in psychology suggests that the strongest commitments are freely
made (under no pressure), publicly expressed and with consequences. The oath used in
these experiments could not be made publicly or have serious consequences if broken.
However, the participants were allowed to participate and given any monetary incentives
regardless of whether or not they signed the oath.
Shogren, et al. (2009) conduct four treatments each of an induced value and a
homegrown auction. The four treatments consist of a baseline with no monetary
incentives and no oath, the baseline with an oath, an auction with monetary incentives but
no oath, and an auction with monetary incentives and an oath. In the induced value
experiments, the authors find that without the oath there is a significant difference
between bidding behavior and perfect demand revelation, regardless of the monetary
incentive. The bidding behavior under oath with a monetary incentive is also insincere.
Bidding behavior under oath with no monetary incentive, however, matches perfect
demand revelation. The authors discover similar results in the homegrown auctions – the
oath seems to keep people from overstating high bids and understating low bids.
Though hypothetical bias is always a concern in stated preference studies, there is
no reason to believe that the present study suffers from serious bias. The meta-analysis
mentioned above indicates the hypothetical bias is usually quite low. In addition, a
polychotomous choice/conjoint elicitation method was used and the willingness to accept
numbers – in the form of revenue – are small. Unfortunately, an oath could not be used in
the present study and the survey used does not include any measures to deal with choice
task complexity or protest attitudes.
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4.3.3 The Proportional odds Assumption
A critical issue peculiar to the ordered logit model is the proportional odds
assumption. An assumption behind the basic ordered logit model is that the effect of the
regressors (except the intercept) is the same for all ratings. SAS provides a Chi-Square
test of this assumption (Liao, 1994). However, this test is sensitive to large sample sizes
(Long & Freese, 2001).
4.3.4 The Repeated Choice Problem: Correlated Error Structure
Another potential problem with using the basic ordered logit model is the repeated
choice nature of this data set. Each individual chose a rating for each of the three
programs presented. In that sense, the data can be viewed as having a panel structure with
cross-sections (individuals) and time-series (three ratings). The three ratings are not truly
time series because they were presented side by side on the same page, leaving
respondents the option to review all programs before deciding on ratings. Yet the
problem is mathematically identical.
The ordered logit model treats an individual’s three ratings as three separate
choices made by identical triplets, not as three choices made by one person. Yet decisions
are likely correlated among individuals across the three choices. If that correlation can be
fully explained by variation in observed independent variables then there is no problem.
However, if there is unobservable correlation then the error structure is no longer in
accordance with model assumptions. Regression results will be inconsistent (Train,
2009).
4.4 Possible Solution for the Proportional odds and Repeated Choice Problems:
The Mixed Ordered Logit
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A mixed ordered logistic model can be used to deal with correlated errors. Unlike
the standard logit, mixed logit estimation allows for random taste variation among
respondents, unrestricted substitution patterns, and correlation among random terms over
time (Train 2009).
The model setup is similar to the basic ordered logit, only the random coefficients
are drawn from a nondegenerate mixing distribution rather than fixed. There are several
ways of representing the model. Hedeker (2006) is followed here in that regard. The
conditional probability of an individual i choosing a particular rating in time period j is
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where  1,2, … , ? with N being sample size,   1,2,3 refers to the choice number,
k is number of fixed coefficients, and r is number of random coefficients. Thus xijk is a N
x k matrix of independent variables, βk is a k x 1 vector of fixed coefficients, zijr is a N x r
matrix of independent variables, and vir is a r x 1 vector of random coefficients.
The mixing distribution governing the behavior of the random coefficients, vir , is
frequently assumed to be a multivariate normal distribution of r dimensions, with mean
vector b and covariance matrix W (Train 2009). In order to obtain those probabilities,
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estimates of b and W must be obtained as well as of β and µ. The unconditional
probability of individual i choosing rating c in time period j is the integral of the
conditional probability times the mixing distribution evaluated over all possible values of
the random coefficients:
9@  A +9@ , <9;   B<9; |C, DE<9;
This is of course not a closed form expression.
In order to overcome that obstacle, simulation is conducted. A random draw is
taken from the multivariate standard normal distribution for each of an individual’s three
choices. Each draw is “unstandardized” using the unknown b and W. The resulting vir’s
are plugged into
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to get simulated conditional probabilities for each individual’s ratings for choices 1-3.
The conditional probability of all three ratings from individual i is obtained by
multiplying the simulated probabilities above:
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where rijc = 1 if individual i chooses rating c in time period j and 0 otherwise. For each
individual, that whole process is repeated, perhaps 1,000 times. The average of the 1,000
simulated conditional probabilities across time associated with each individual is taken as
the simulated closed-form solution to the previous open-form unconditional probability
expression:
,===
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Finally, the simulated log likelihood function is then:
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This function is maximized with respect to β,µ, b and W to yield estimates for the mixed
ordered logit model with repeated choices.
To obtain probabilities for each rating given average values of the independent
variables, the average values b are used in place of vir. The same techniques can then be
applied as with the standard ordered logit to get average marginal effects of changes in
independent variables on the probability of choosing a rating.
In theory, the mixed ordered logit model will be ideal for analyzing this survey
data. It has none of the limitations of the multinomial, binomial or binary logit models. It
is not limited by the proportional odds assumption of the standard ordered logit and
allows for intra-person correlation among rating choices. The only issues it does not
account for include choice task complexity and protest attitudes. However, the mixed
ordered logit model is not used in the final analysis for reasons that will be made clear in
chapter 5.
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4.5 Summary
In this chapter, several possible discrete choice models are considered for analysis
of the survey ratings data. The ordered logit is the best candidate among the non-mixed
models. Hypothetical bias is always a potential problem with stated choice data but is not
viewed as a serious issue for the present study. The ordered logit model does have
estimation pitfalls. It does not account for choice task complexity, protest attitudes, or the
repeated choice nature of the data set. If the proportional odds assumption behind the
ordered logit is unreasonable, results will be biased; yet assessment of the assumption’s
validity is difficult because the test is sensitive to large sample sizes. The mixed ordered
logit would solve all of those problems except for choice task complexity and protest
attitude biases. This model will not be used in the final analysis, however, for reasons
enumerated in the next chapter.
In chapter 5, the survey data are analyzed using the standard ordered logit model.
Estimation of the mixed ordered logit is attempted but fails. Odds ratio effects,
probabilities for each rating by program, and partial effects are presented.
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CHAPTER 5
DATA ANALYSIS
5.1 Programs at a Glance
A descriptive analysis of the data shows a tri-modal or bi-modal distribution of
ratings for each program. The bulk of respondents seem to rate programs at a 1, 5, or 10.
Figures 1-12 below show the distribution of responses for each program presented in the
survey. The attributes for each program are detailed in Appendix B.
Figure 1: Distribution of Ratings for Survey Version 1 Programs
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Figure 2:Distribution of Ratings for Survey Version 2 Programs
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Figure 3: Distribution of Ratings for Survey Version 3 Programs
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Figure 4: Distribution of Ratings for Survey Version 4 Programs
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The popularity of a particular program can be roughly assessed at a glance by
noting whether category 1 or category 10 has a higher frequency of ratings. Table 3
below provides additional information on respondents’ ratings by program.
Table 3: Summary Statistics on Ratings by Program
Rating Statistic

Survey
1
Survey
2
Survey
3
Survey
4

Program
Number Average Median
1
5.8
5
2
4.1
4
3
5.6
6
1
4.9
5
2
6.6
8
3
4.4
5
1
5.0
5
2
3.0
2
3
6.1
7
1
3.1
2
2
6.1
7
3
4.1
4
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Mode
5
1
1
1
10
1
1
1
10
1
10
1

Standard
Deviation
3.1
2.8
3.5
3.3
3.4
3.0
3.1
2.5
3.6
2.5
3.6
3.0

Program 2 in survey version 3 appears remarkably unpopular. Other seemingly
unpopular programs include numbers 1 and 3 in survey version 4. Program 2 of survey
version 4 is notably popular. Respondents seem to feel relatively positive about programs
2 and 3 of survey versions 2 and 3, respectively. Respondents appear less unified in their
attitudes toward remaining programs. Probabilities for landowner participation are
expected to follow these observations.
5.2 Individual Characteristics
The Family Forest Research Center achieved a high response rate to the mail
survey of around 50 percent. However of those 1,403 respondents who returned surveys,
only 910 rated the three programs. There were no follow-up questions to assess whether
these resulted from protest attitudes or choice task complexity issues. However, the
potential for bias is estimated by comparing characteristics of those respondents who
rated the three programs to all respondents generally. If the group that rated the programs
is significantly different from the group as a whole in terms of independent variables used
in the ordered logit analysis then protest attitudes, choice task complexity, and/or sample
selection bias is present.
Table 4 below shows proportions of respondents with particular individual
characteristics for the group that rated all three programs and for all survey respondents
as a whole. The table also gives the probability value associated with a two-tailed Z test
of the difference between the two proportions.
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Table 4: Differences in Characteristic Proportions Between All Received Surveys
and Only Surveys with Three Program Ratings

Surveys with
three ratings
All received
surveys
Difference
P > |Z|

Acre

Older

LowerEd

HigherEd

Male

0.525

0.231

0.147

0.398

0.747

0.545

0.292

0.168

0.359

0.736

-0.020
0.346

-0.061
0.001

-0.021
0.179

0.039
0.056

0.012
0.531

The proportion of respondents with over 100 acres who rated all three programs is less
than for all survey respondents. The same is true for respondents over the age of 65 and
for those with a high school diploma or less. The proportion of respondents with more
than a college degree and who are male is higher among those who rated all three
programs compared to all survey respondents.
The only significant differences between the program raters and all respondents as
a whole, however, are with respect to age and higher education using a five percent level
of significance. Significantly fewer people over the age of 65 rated the three programs
while significantly more respondents with more than a college degree rated the three
programs compared to all survey respondents. If difference in proportions with respect to
respondents with a high school diploma or less is tested with a one-tailed test, the
difference between program raters and respondents as a whole is significant at the ten
percent level of significance. Significantly fewer respondents with a lower level of
education rated the three programs.
It would not be far fetched to suppose that the proportion differences with respect
to education level reflect choice task complexity issues. Aggregation for selling carbon
offsets on the Chicago Climate Exchange is not a simple concept to convey to the
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uninitiated (see Appendix C). There is no way to verify either choice task complexity or
protest attitude problems; yet it is clear that these differences probably bias results of the
ordered logit regression. The analysis proceeds having offered this caveat.
5.2 Estimation Problems: The Mixed Ordered Logit
Estimation of a mixed ordered logit model failed. An optimum could not be
reached when maximizing the simulated log-likelihood function. To find an optimum,
numerical integration is performed in as many dimensions as there are random
coefficients in the model. That complexity combined with fact that there are 10 different
category ratings appears to render the model intractable given the data set.
5.3 Standard Ordered Logit Results
An assessment of potential sources of bias mentioned in the previous chapter is
conducted below. The repeated choice and proportional odds assumption problems are
reconsidered. The stepwise procedure used to select indicator and interaction variables is
shown. Ordered logit regression output and interpretation are then presented.
5.3.1 The Repeated Choice Problem
The standard ordered logit was ultimately used in place of the mixed model.
Results are interpreted with the precaution that there is the potential for bias because the
model does not account for correlation of individual choices across time. Results are
robust in so far as any intra-person correlation is successfully explained by variation in
program attributes.
5.3.2 The Proportional Odds Problem
An additional precaution is that the proportional odds assumption appears to be
violated. The associated Chi-Square test compares the likelihood ratio of the standard
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ordered logit to that of a nonproportional odds model (a multinomial logit). The test
statistic is highly significant at 112 degrees of freedom; however, the test is sensitive to
large sample sizes. Furthermore, the only alternatives are not reasonable. One is to run a
binary logit for each of the 10 ratings and estimate different sets of coefficients for each
rating. Around 140 parameters would have to be estimated. That approach is inefficient
and is not considered. The other alternative is to conduct a multinomial logit analysis
wherein each rating is treated as a non-ordinal choice. This approach ignores the ordinal
nature of the ratings data. The ordered logit analysis continues having offered these
caveats.
5.3.3 Indicators and Interactions: A Stepwise Procedure
A stepwise procedure was used with the ordered logit to determine which
individual characteristic and interaction variables to include in the final model. The base
model included just the management plan requirement indicator, time commitment, peracre revenue, and early withdrawal penalty indicator. Using a series of likelihood ratio
tests, characteristics and interactions were added and accepted or rejected one by one.
The effect of the continuous variable, acres owned, was rejected while a dummy
variable indicating that the respondent owns 100 acres or more was included. Age was
broken into three categories: 66 and older, 51-65 and 50 or younger. Only the 66 and
older indicator was retained. A gender dummy indicating male was included. Level of
education was split into three categories: a high school diploma or less, some college or a
college degree, and beyond a college degree. With the middle category represented by the
intercept, both the lower and higher education indicators were included in the model.
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All possible interactions were considered. Only five remained after likelihood
ratio testing. These include management plan with older than 65; revenue with older than
65; management plan with lower education; revenue with lower education; and time
commitment with male.
5.3.4 Regression Results
Regression results show that every rating level is significant. That suggests that
each cutpoint is statistically important and cannot be viewed as measurement error.
Results of the regression are included in table 5 below:
Table 5: Ordered Logit Results
Parameter
Cutpoint 1
Cutpoint 2
Cutpoint 3
Cutpoint 4
Cutpoint 5
Cutpoint 6
Cutpoint 7
Cutpoint 8
Cutpoint 9
Plan
Time
Rev
Pen
Acre
Older
LowerEd
HigherEd
Male
Plan*Older
Rev*Older
Plan*LowerEd
Rev*LowerEd
Time*Male

Estimate Odds Ratio
-1.047
0.35
-0.769
0.46
-0.534
0.59
-0.384
0.68
0.416
1.52
0.639
1.89
0.970
2.64
1.557
4.74
1.875
6.52
-0.215
0.81
-0.086
0.92
0.060
1.06
-0.419
0.66
0.121
1.13
-0.090
0.91
-0.122
0.89
0.431
1.54
-0.636
0.53
-0.348
0.71
-0.025
0.98
-0.384
0.68
-0.018
0.98
0.059
1.06
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ChiSquare Pr>ChiSq
19.688
<.0001
10.673
0.001
5.159
0.023
2.664
0.103
3.133
0.077
7.376
0.007
16.930
<.0001
43.045
<.0001
61.765
<.0001
6.790
0.009
9.583
0.002
214.468
<.0001
32.859
<.0001
3.050
0.081
0.252
0.615
0.316
0.574
32.873
<.0001
6.428
0.011
4.451
0.035
9.926
0.002
3.665
0.056
3.580
0.059
3.507
0.061

All attribute and characteristic coefficients are significant except for the age (66
or older) and education (high school diploma or less) indicators. All estimates have the
expected signs. The odds of choosing a higher rating are lower by a factor of 0.81 where
a management plan is required, by a factor of 0.92 with an additional year of time
commitment, and by 0.66 where there is an early withdrawal penalty. Odds of a higher
rating decrease by a factor of 0.91where the respondent is 66 or older, by 0.89 for the
lower education level and by 0.53 where the respondent is male. The odds decrease even
more where a management plan is required for older (by a factor of 0.71) and less
educated respondents (0.68). Odds decrease less at higher time commitments for males
than for females. The odds decrease less by a factor of 1.06 for an extra year where the
respondent is male. A higher per-acre annual revenue increases odds of a higher rating
less by a factor of 0.98 for older and also by 0.98 for less educated respondents than for
others, though odds do increase for those two groups with increased revenue. Odds of a
higher rating increase with higher per-acre revenue generally (by a factor of 1.06 for a $1
per acre per year increase) and when the respondent is from the higher education category
(1.54) and owns 100 acres or more (1.13).
5.4 Binary Logit: A Comparison
It is clear from the significance of the cutpoints in the ordered logit model that the
binary logit, which codes 1-9 as 0 and 10 as 1, misses a great deal of information. To
further investigate the apparent problem with the binary model, regression results are
included in table 6 below.
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Table 6: Binary Logit Results
Parameter
Intercept
Plan
Time
Rev
Pen
Acre
Older
LowerEd
HigherEd
Male
Plan*Older
Rev*Older
Plan*LowerEd
Rev*LowerEd
Time*Male

Estimate
2.411
-0.342
-0.068
0.082
-0.513
0.113
-0.135
-0.084
0.329
-0.216
-0.497
-0.014
-0.780
-0.008
0.008

Odds
Ratio
11.145
0.710
0.934
1.085
0.599
1.120
0.874
0.919
1.390
0.806
0.608
0.986
0.458
0.992
1.008

ChiSquare
43.293
5.440
2.437
136.121
13.726
0.955
0.146
0.030
7.358
0.305
2.810
0.938
3.381
0.144
0.027

Pr>ChiSq
<.0001
0.020
0.119
<.0001
0.000
0.329
0.703
0.863
0.007
0.581
0.094
0.333
0.066
0.705
0.870

Indeed, many of the coefficient estimates in the binary model are insignificant, though
signs are identical and magnitudes at least comparable. The only significant coefficients
are the intercept, management plan, revenue, penalty, age and the interactions between
management plan and age and education. These results are consistent with expectations;
the binary model ignores important information in the 1-9 ratings.
In spite of the insignificance of many of the binary estimates, probabilities for a
10 rating are expected to be close between the ordered and binary models. Table 7 below
shows the probabilities of each rating associated with each of the 12 programs for the
ordered model. At the bottom are the binary model probabilities.
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Table 7: Probabilities of Ratings by Program for Ordered and Binary Models
Survey 1
P2

P2

Survey 2
P3

P1

Survey 3

P2

P3

P1

Survey 4

P2

P3

P1

P2

P3

Ordered Logit

P(R=1)
P(R=2)
P(R=3)
P(R=4)
P(R=5)
P(R=6)
P(R=7)
P(R=8)
P(R=9)
P(R=10)

0.190

0.396

0.181

0.299

0.126

0.353

0.225

0.553

0.152

0.446

0.105

0.403

0.046

0.068

0.045

0.061

0.034

0.066

0.052

0.067

0.039

0.069

0.029

0.068

0.045

0.059

0.044

0.056

0.034

0.058

0.049

0.054

0.039

0.058

0.030

0.059

0.031

0.037

0.031

0.037

0.025

0.038

0.034

0.032

0.028

0.036

0.022

0.037

0.190

0.179

0.188

0.195

0.165

0.188

0.196

0.136

0.178

0.167

0.151

0.177

0.055

0.041

0.056

0.049

0.054

0.044

0.054

0.027

0.055

0.036

0.051

0.040

0.079

0.052

0.080

0.065

0.082

0.057

0.075

0.033

0.082

0.045

0.081

0.051

0.122

0.067

0.125

0.090

0.141

0.077

0.111

0.041

0.134

0.058

0.145

0.066

0.053

0.026

0.055

0.036

0.067

0.030

0.047

0.015

0.061

0.021

0.072

0.025

0.187

0.076

0.196

0.112

0.272

0.090

0.157

0.042

0.230

0.063

0.315

0.074

Binary Logit

P(Yes)
% Dif.

0.173

0.062

0.234

0.085

0.301

0.082

0.130

0.027

0.266

0.038

0.338

0.060

2.705

3.222

4.083

2.764

3.253

3.283

2.609

3.528

3.687

3.072

3.024

3.243

For both models, the probabilities are calculated with program attribute levels
corresponding to the version and program number and individual characteristics
corresponding to the sample modes (they are all indicator variables). As expected, binary
and ordered probabilities are close. They differ by no more than 4 percent. However,
results of the ordered logit model give more information about ratings 1-9 and show
nearly all coefficients to be significant, as indicated above. The ordered logit is used for
the remainder of the analysis.
The least popular program – that is, the program with the lowest probability of a
rating for a 10 – among modal respondents is program 2 in survey version 3. That
matches preliminary findings from the distribution of ratings presented above. This
program requires a management plan, has a 10 year time commitment, offers only a $5
per acre annual revenue, and includes a penalty for early withdrawal from the program.
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The most popular program is the second in survey version 4. That program has a
management plan, a five year time commitment, a $30 per acre annual revenue, and no
penalty for early withdrawal.
5.5 Partial Effects
Partial effects can be calculated for any combination of program attributes and
individual characteristics. The conventional way to present partial effects is to use
average or modal values for the independent variables. Below, two sets of partial effects
are calculated. Both sets use modal individual characteristics, but the first uses average
program attributes (averaged using the 12 programs from the survey). The second set
uses more realistic program attributes that correspond to real CCX aggregator programs.
Those attribute levels are as follows. A management plan is required. There is a
15 year minimum time commitment. Expected revenue is $8 per acre annually. There is a
penalty for early withdrawal. Results for average attributes are summarized in table 8
below:
Table 8: Partial Effects on Probability of a 10 Rating Using Average Program
Attributes and Modal Individual Characteristics
Variable

Effect

Variable

Plan

-0.028 HigherEd

Time

-0.015 Male

Effect
0.070
-0.010

Rev

0.010 Plan*Older

-0.093

Pen

-0.051 Rev*Older

-0.003

Acre

0.016 Plan*LowerEd

-0.102

Older

-0.042 Rev*LowerEd

-0.002

LowerEd

-0.052 Time*Male

0.010

Results obtained using the more realistic attribute levels are summarized in table 9 below:
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Table 9: Partial Effects on Probability of a 10 Rating Using CCX-Like Attributes
and Modal Individual Characteristics
Variable

Effect

Variable

Plan

-0.011 HigherEd

Time

-0.004 Male

Effect
0.025
-0.011

Rev

0.003 Plan*Older

-0.018

Pen

-0.024 Rev*Older

-0.001

Acre

0.005 Plan*LowerEd

-0.023

Older

-0.005 Rev*LowerEd

-0.001

LowerEd

-0.011 Time*Male

0.003

Partial effects are universally smaller in magnitude when evaluated at more realistic
program attribute levels. The cause is probably the relative unpopularity of the realistic
attribute levels across all types of respondents. These partial effects give more useful
information, since the program attribute levels in the other set of partial effects are
unlikely. These effects are discussed below.
The partial effects generally conform to expectations. Holding individual
characteristics at their modes, eliminating the required management plan increases the
probability of a 10 rating by 1.1 percent for people under the age of 66 who have some
college or a college degree. Note that the effect shown in the table is negative to
emphasize that landowners do not like the management plan. However, the effect is
calculated by changing from a CCX-like program in which there is a required
management plan, to a program that does not require one. Thus, the effect is described as
positive. The same is true for the early withdrawal penalty effect. The management plan
effect is 2.9 percent for older people with more than a high school diploma, 3.4 percent
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for younger people with less education, and 5.2 percent for those who are both older and
less educated.
Taking off a year of time commitment from the 15 years increases the chance of a
10 rating by 0.4 percent for females and by 0.3 percent for males. An extra dollar per acre
annual return on top of the $8 yields a 0.3 percent increase in probability for younger
people with at least some college education. That number is 0.2 percent both for older
and for less educated respondents. For respondents who are both older and less educated,
that number is 0.1 percent.
Removing the penalty for early withdrawal makes respondents 2.4 percent more
likely to give a 10 rating. Owning less than 100 acres makes people 0.5 percent less likely
to choose a 10. Being over the age of 66 reduces the chance of a 10 by 0.5 percent.
Having only a high school education or less means that chance is 1.1 percent lower.
Having more education than a college degree leads to a 2.5 percent increase in the chance
of a 10. Finally, being female leads to a 1.1 percent increase in that chance.
The marginal effects calculated at modal individual characteristics and CCX-like
program attributes show the policy maker how probabilities change with changes in
attribute levels or individual characteristics when the most prevalent type of landowner is
considered. A more useful set of marginal effects can be calculated using the modal
characteristics of landowners who gave a 6-9 rating for any given program. These
landowners are not completely certain that they would participate in the given program,
but at least feel somewhat positive about the possibility of participation. The policy
maker interested in enticing greater participation should focus on that group. An IFM
program could be developed with the intention of appealing to the type of landowner that

53

feels at least a little positive about participating in any given IFM offset program.
Marginal effects for program attributes are presented for this group in table 10 below.
The modal respondent who gave a 6-9 rating is slightly different from the general
modal survey respondent. The only difference is that the modal respondent with a 6-9
rating has more than a college degree while the general modal respondent has more than
a high school diploma but no more than a college degree. The modal respondent with a 69 rating, like the general modal respondent, owns more than 100 acres, is 65 years or less
in age, and is male. The marginal effects of program attributes using realistic CCX-like
parameters are presented below in table 10. The effects represent the change in
probability of a 10 rating that results from removing the management plan requirement,
decreasing the time commitment by a year, increasing the per acre annual revenue by $1,
and removing the early withdrawal penalty.
Table 10: Partial Effects on Probability of a 10 Rating Using Modal Characteristics
of Respondents with 6-9 Ratings
Variable
Plan
Time
Rev
Pen

Effect
-0.014
-0.006
0.005
-0.001

The magnitudes of the effects of eliminating the management plan, subtracting a
year of time commitment, and adding a dollar per acre per year of revenue are slightly
larger for the modal respondent who gave a 6-9 rating than for the general modal
respondent. The effect of eliminating the management plan is to increase the probability
of a 10 rating by 1.4 percent. Subtracting a year of time commitment and adding a dollar
of revenue increase that probability by 0.6 and 0.5 percent, respectively. That indicates
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that the 6-9 modal respondent cares slightly more about those attributes than the general
modal respondent. The opposite is true for the effect of eliminating the early withdrawal
penalty; it is smaller in magnitude for the 6-9 respondent. The effect of removing the
early withdrawal penalty is to increase the probability of a 10 rating by only 0.1 percent.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, the ratings data are summarized with descriptive statistics. The
standard ordered logit model is estimated with the caveat that the repeated choice and
proportional odds assumption problems cannot be dealt with; the mixed ordered logit
estimation failed. Ordered logit regression output and interpretation proceeds.
In accordance with the findings of Fletcher, et al., the requirement of a
management plan and an early withdrawal penalty lead to lower probabilities of a 10
rating while higher revenue means a higher probability. In contrast to their findings, an
extra year of time commitment appears to decrease the probability of a 10 rating. Also in
contrast to the results of Fletcher, et al., several individual characteristics are significant,
including acres owned, gender, age and level of education. This difference in findings is
likely a result of the use of both a small sample size and the binary logit model in the
previous study.
In chapter 6, policy implications of the ordered logit results are presented.
Lessons learned from the survey and its analysis are discussed. Recommendations for
future research in this are made.
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CHAPTER 6
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This chapter is intended to inform policy making in the area of carbon
sequestration programs and to make recommendations for future researchers in this field.
The section below shows how the policy maker faces a tradeoff in crafting an ideal
carbon sequestration program. There is also a discussion of how the policy maker should
consider the population of landowners of interest; the program can be targeted toward
specific types of landowners. The second section covers lessons learned from
implementing the landowner survey and from estimating the ordered logit model. Future
research directions are suggested.
6.1 Policy Implications
The ordered logit results make clear that a policy maker interested in crafting a
NIPF landowner-friendly carbon offset program faces a tradeoff between conflicting
policy elements. There are two major issues a policy maker will likely consider in
crafting such a program. First, there are the usual carbon offset considerations including
verifiability, additionality and permanence. These issues are not dealt with here, but
rather left to the carbon scientists. Second, the policy maker must consider the likelihood
that forest owners will participate in the program. That issue is the motivation behind this
study. Yet the two sets of issues contradict one another; the most sound carbon
sequestration program will be the least agreeable for the average family forest owner.
6.1.1 Maximum Participation Versus Maximum Carbon Sequestration
Based on the estimated partial effects of program attributes, the ideal program – in
terms of garnering maximum landowner participation – would have no management plan
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required, minimal time commitment, a high per-acre annual revenue stream, and no early
withdrawal penalty. The Chapter 61B current tax use program closely resembles this type
of program.
Yet a management plan is required for participation in the CCX aggregators
currently in existence. A minimum of 15 years’ time commitment is required. There is a
penalty for early withdrawal. The reason for these conditions of involvement, of course,
is that they help ensure that the carbon offsets created are verifiable, additional and
permanent. Verifiability means it can be proven that the carbon offsets truly represent
carbon sequestration. Additionality means the offsets are in addition to the carbon
sequestration that would happen if there were no offsets. An offset is permanent if the
sequestered carbon is taken out of the atmosphere forever. If no management plan is
required of participants, there is no way to quantify the carbon sequestration that results
from managing the land in a particular way. Offsets would probably not be verifiable and
might not be additional or permanent. A very short time commitment would not result in
permanent carbon offsets. The absence of an early withdrawal penalty in an offset
program would mean there is no incentive to keep the carbon sequestered once payments
are received by the landowner; permanence of the offset would be questionable.
The CCX-type aggregation program conditions, combined with a reasonable
expected revenue of $8 per acre per year, closely resemble the least popular programs
presented to survey respondents. A Chapter 61B-type program resembles the most
popular program rated by survey respondents. There is a fundamental tension between
the ideal program in terms of landowner participation and a program that results in
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verifiable, additional and permanent carbon offsets. The policy maker must balance these
competing measures.
6.1.2 The Population of Interest
The policy maker should consider whether his or her population of interest
resembles the modal values of individual characteristics included in this study. The
modal respondent is a male below the age of 66, with some college or a college degree
and who owns 100 acres or more. If the population of interest is highly educated females,
the probability of rating a CCX-like program at a 10 is about 3.6 percent higher. If the
population of interest consists of older males with only high school diplomas with less
than 100 acres, the probability of a 10 rating is 4.2 percent lower.
The policy maker may want to consider the type of population that gave 6-9
ratings in the survey; that type of respondent feels positively if not certain about
participation. The modal 6-9 rating respondent is the same as the general modal
respondent except that he has more than a college degree. The probability of a 10 rating
of a CCX-like program is higher for this group by about 2.5 percent than for the general
modal respondent. The difference is much greater for a Chapter 61B-type program; the 69 modal respondent’s probability of 10 rating is about 10 percent higher than for the
general modal respondent.
6.1.3 Subsidies
Another consideration for the policy maker might be some form of subsidy to the
prospective participant. For example, an agency that aggregates offsets for the CCX
could absorb the early withdrawal penalties, eliminating that risk for the landowner. Or
the agency might offer subsidies on top of the revenue earned in the offset market. A
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policy maker might even consider operating a program outside the offset market, simply
paying landowners to sequester carbon. In that case, there need be no required
management plan, no early withdrawal penalty and flexible time commitment and
revenue possibilities. That type of program would be similar to the Chapter 61B current
tax use program. The following table shows the probabilities that the modal respondent
would give a 10 rating for several different attribute combinations.
Table 11: Probabilities of 10 Ratings for Modal Respondents at Different Program
Attributed Levels
Required
Plan?
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
no
no
no

Time
Commitment
15
15
15
15
5
5
5
5

Revenue Penalty? Probability
8
8
30
30
5
5
30
30

yes
no
yes
no
yes
no
yes
no

0.050
0.074
0.166
0.233
0.067
0.098
0.244
0.329

The first program represents a CCX-like program. The second, third and fourth
programs show how a government agency might sweeten the deal for participants in a
CCX-like program by absorbing any early withdrawal penalties and/or subsidizing the
per-acre revenue. The basic CCX-like program with no penalty absorption or subsidy has
a probability of a 10 rating of only 5 percent. That probability jumps to 23.3 percent with
a $22 per acre per year subsidy (on top of the CCX-earned revenue) and penalty
absorption.
The last four rows show programs that an agency might consider outside the
offset market, simply to persuade landowners to sequester carbon. The revenue in all four
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programs represents a pure subsidy. This might be a Chapter 61B-like program explicitly
designed for carbon sequestration.
The probabilities depend largely on revenue. The first two Chapter 61B-like
programs have probabilities of a 10 rating of 6.7 and 9.8 percent. They differ only in
whether or not there is an early withdrawal penalty. The second and third Chapter 61Blike programs are the same as the first two except that revenue is $30 instead of $5. Those
probabilities are 24.4 and 32.9 percent, respectively.
The program with the highest probability of a 10 rating is, not surprisingly, the
one in which there is no required plan, five year time commitment, $30 per acre annual
revenue and no early withdrawal penalty. This program has a 32.9 percent chance of a 10
rating. Of course, the merits of such a program are questionable at best in terms the
verifiability, additionality and permanence of its carbon sequestration.
As mentioned above, the policy maker may wish to target the type of landowner
who gave 6-9 ratings with its carbon sequestration program because that landowner feels
somewhat positive about participation. Table 12 below shows the same set of
probabilities of a 10 rating as in table 11, but calculated for the modal 6-9 rating
respondent rather than for the general modal respondent.
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Table 12: Probabilities of 10 Rating for Modal Respondents with 6-9 Ratings at
Different Program Attribute Levels
Required
Time
Plan?
Commitment Revenue Penalty? Probability
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
no
no
no

15
15
15
15
5
5
5
5

8
8
30
30
5
5
30
30

yes
No
yes
No
yes
No
yes
No

0.075
0.110
0.235
0.318
0.099
0.143
0.331
0.430

The probabilities are of course all much higher for the modal 6-9 rating
respondent; that is because he has a higher level of education than the general modal
respondent. Notably, this type of respondent is 2.5 percent more likely to give a 10 rating
to a straight CCX-like program than the general modal respondent. The probability of
giving a 10 rating for a CCX-like program in which a government agency has absorbed
the early withdrawal penalty and subsidized $22 on top of the CCX-earned revenue is
31.8 percent – about 9 percent higher than for the general modal respondent.
The probability of a 10 rating for a Chapter 61B-like program is 9.9 percent
where there is a penalty for early withdrawal and only a $5 per acre annual revenue. That
is about 3 percent higher than for the general modal respondent. The highest probability
of a 10 rating corresponds to the Chapter 61B-like program that has no early withdrawal
penalty and a $30 subsidy. That probability is 43 percent – about 10 percent higher than
for the general modal respondent.
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6.2 Recommendations for Future Research
Another set of conclusions to draw from this analysis consists of
recommendations for future research in the field of landowner participation in carbon
sequestration programs. Recommendations for survey format, including a discussion of
the particular method of choice elicitation and how to deal with choice task complexity
and protest issues, follow in the sections below.
6.2.1 Choice Elicitation Method: Ratings Versus Direct Choice
The format of the survey questions used in this study limited analysis of the data
in some ways while enhancing the analysis in others. The panel structure of the rating
choices cannot be modeled because a mixed ordered regression is intractable. The
estimation results may consequently be somewhat biased. The ratings cannot reasonably
be converted to ranking data for use in the censored rank-ordered multinomial logit
model because too many observations would have to be cut. Nor can they be converted to
choice data for use in an ordinary MNL model – there are too many tied ratings and there
is no exit or status quo option.
A basic MNL or nested logit model could be estimated if respondents were asked
to choose between the three programs and an exit, or status quo, option. The repeated
choice problem would disappear. The choice set would be complete. Estimation would be
quite simple.
However, there is an information cost to requiring respondents to make a direct
choice. That method of elicitation does not allow for uncertainty on the part of the
respondent. When respondents face the rating format, they can express uncertainty on the
ordinal rating scale about whether they would participate or not while providing valuable
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information about the effect of independent variables on attitudes toward programs. A
likely effect of not allowing respondents to express uncertainty is to force unsure
respondents to choose the status quo. Someone who might have given a rating in the 6-9
range for each of the three programs would likely choose to participate in none of the
programs with the direct choice format. A great deal of information would be lost. That
would likely result in misleading insignificance of important independent variables.
Thus, the researcher faces a serious tradeoff when deciding between ratings and
direct choice formats. Researchers in the field of discrete choice analysis should explore
this tradeoff further. A survey could be conducted in which half of respondents face a
rating format while the other half faces a direct choice format. The first half would be
analyzed with an ordered logit model. A multinomial logit or one of its variants would be
used for the second half. Parameter estimates, probabilities and marginal effects could be
compared across the two models. If the results are not significantly different then direct
choice and ratings formats are equally valid.
A significant difference between multinomial a ordered logit results would most
likely manifest itself in lower probabilities of a yes and insignificant parameter estimates
from the multinomial logit estimation. In that case it can be assumed that the direct
choice format causes a serious loss of information. The ratings format and the ordered
logit would give more accurate results because they account for uncertainty in responses.
The only serious limitation of the ratings format lies in model estimation. If a
mixed ordered logit model could be used, the proportional odds and repeated choice
problems detailed in chapter 4 would disappear. The problem encountered in this study of
not finding an optimum in maximizing the simulated log likelihood function should be
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further investigated. There are numerous numerical integration techniques for
maximizing simulated log likelihood functions in mixed models. Though it is beyond the
scope of the present study, these techniques should all be explored to determine whether
some work better with the ordered logit model.
A solution that makes possible estimation of a mixed ordered logit for the type of
data used in this study would comprise the best possible procedure for similar research
endeavors. The ratings format could be used without worrying about the issues
surrounding the standard ordered logit.
6.2.2 Better Capturing of Choice Task Complexity and Protest Issues
The offset programs are probably difficult to understand for many respondents.
There is undoubtedly a choice task complexity problem with this survey. That problem
could easily be assessed and accounted for with a survey design that includes varying
choice task complexity, as detailed by DeShazo and Fermo (2002). A heteroskedastic
logit model would be estimated to account for the choice task complexity..
There was also very likely a protest attitude problem in the survey. Many
respondents sent the survey back with angry words about government intrusion, refusing
to rate the programs or simply giving all three programs a 1 rating. That too can bias
results and should be accounted for with follow-up questions in the survey.
6.3 Summary
A policy maker interested in crafting a carbon sequestration program for
Massachusetts, either by aggregating landowners’ IFM offsets for the CCX or through
pure subsidies as with a Chapter 61B-type program, faces an unfortunate tradeoff. He or
she must balance the likelihood of landowner participation on one hand with verifiable,
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additional and permanent carbon sequestration on the other. The most popular carbon
sequestration programs are the least legitimate.
The policy maker should consider what population to target in crafting the
program. If he or she wants to target the most common type of landowner, there is one set
of probabilities of a 10 rating corresponding to different types of programs. For this
group, the least popular CCX-based program has a 5 percent chance of a 10 rating. The
most popular Chapter 61B-based program has a 33 percent chance of a 10 rating.
A better approach may be to target the type of respondent who feels positively,
though perhaps not certain, about participation. For that group there is another set of
probabilities of a 10 rating corresponding to different program types. The least popular
program has a 7.5 percent chance of a 10 rating while the most popular one has a 43
percent chance.
The researcher in this field of landowner participation in carbon sequestration
programs faces a tradeoff as well. The tradeoff is between the benefits of using rating
versus direct choice formats in the landowner survey. At present there is no obvious best
survey format. Future research will hopefully identify an optimal procedure or at least
further elucidate the problem. However, there are known methods for dealing with choice
task complexity and protest attitudes that can bias results. An ideal survey with respect to
those issues would have non-constant choice task complexity across surveys and several
follow-up questions to assess the extent of protest attitudes.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Overwhelming scientific evidence indicates that global warming is a serious,
human-caused threat. American owners of non-industrial private forests (NIPF) can help
mitigate global warming by managing their forests in a way that maximizes carbon
sequestration. There are domestic markets for the trade of carbon offsets that come from
such improved forest management (IFM), including over the counter markets and the
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX). Possible future opportunities for the Massachusetts
NIPF owner to sell IFM offsets lie in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and a
national cap and trade program outlined in the House and Senate versions of a new
climate legislation.
At the moment there are scant opportunities for the Massachusetts NIPF
landowner to participate in IFM offset markets. This paper examines the willingness of
Massachusetts landowners to participate in either private aggregation programs for the
CCX or in government-sponsored programs like Chapter 61B to induce carbon
sequestration.
Using a recent landowner survey conducted by the Family Forest Research
Center, an ordered logit model of respondents’ ratings of hypothetical programs is
estimated. Results indicate that landowners are less likely to give a 10 rating to a program
that requires a management plan to be filed, has a higher time commitment, and has an
early withdrawal. Landowners are more likely to give a 10 rating to a program with
higher per acre annual revenue. Male, lower educated and older landowners are less
likely to give a 10 rating to any program. Younger females with a higher level of
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education and who own more than 100 acres are more likely to give a 10 rating. Males
are less concerned about higher time commitments than females, though the effect of a
higher time commitment on probability of a 10 rating is negative for both. Lower
educated and older respondents care less about the early withdrawal penalty and about
revenue than other respondents.
Results show that the probability that the average respondent would give a 10
rating is very low – around five percent. Even those with more favorable demographics
are not very likely to participate. That appears to be the result of low expected payment
($8 annually per acre) and an aversion toward a required management plan, lengthy time
commitment and early withdrawal penalty.
To make landowner participation in IFM offset programs in Massachusetts more
likely, a policy maker would have to change some or all of the policy attributes currently
facing prospective CCX aggregation program participants. The probability that an
average respondent would participate in a totally landowner-friendly program is around
33 percent. Such a program would have no required management plan, only a five year
time commitment, a $30 per acre annual revenue and no early withdrawal penalty.
However, if the policy maker’s goal is to maximize carbon sequestration, the deal
should not be too sweet for landowners. Without a forestry management plan, serious
time commitment and disincentive for quitting early, an IFM program would likely not
result in verifiable, permanent or additional carbon sequestration.
The policy maker should consider the target demographic for his or her carbon
sequestration program. Rather than targeting the most common type of landowner, a
better approach might be to target respondents that feel more positive about participating.
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That demographic has a higher level of education than the general modal respondent. The
probability of a 10 rating for the least popular, CCX-based program is 7.5 percent – 2.5
percent higher than for the modal respondent. The chance of a 10 rating for the most
popular, Chapter 61B-based program is 43 percent – 10 percent higher than for the modal
respondent.
Several recommendations can be made regarding future research of this type.
There is no clearly optimal survey format with respect to ratings versus direct choice
elicitation for this type of study. The advantage of using ratings is that uncertainty on the
part of the respondent is allowed, which yields more information about the landowner
attitudes than a direct choice format. However, there are estimation problems associated
with ratings data. The advantage of using a direct choice format is that many more
options for estimation are available with direct choice data. The problem is that
information is likely lost by forcing respondents to make an absolute choice. Surveys
similar to the one used in this study might include non-constant choice task complexity
across surveys as well as follow-up questions to assess any protest attitude issues.
Finally, possibilities for mixed ordered logit estimation should be investigated, such as
alternative numerical integration techniques.
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APPENDIX A
PROGRAMS FROM THE SURVEY
Attributes and Levels for Each of the 12 Programs
Version 1
Version 2
Version 3
Version 4
P1
P2
P3
P1
P2
P3
P1
P2
P3
P1
P2
P3
Attr.
No
no
no
No
no
no
yes
yes yes yes yes
yes
Plan
5
10
10
5
5
10
5
10
10
5
5
10
Time
15
5
30
5
30
15
15
5
30
5
30
15
Rev
No
no
yes
No
yes yes
no
yes
no
yes
no
yes
Pen
Plan: Management plan required? A 0 indicates no.
Time: Time commitment, in years. Takes on values of 5 and 10 years.
Rev: Expected per-acre revenue, net of all costs ($). Takes on values of 5, 15 and 30
dollars per acre per year.
Pen: Penalty for early withdrawal? A 0 indicates no.
Notes: each respondent rated three of the above programs, depending on which survey
version he or she received. In total, 12 different programs were rated by different
respondents.
A fractional factorial design was used to decide the attribute levels for each program.
There are no pure dominant or reverse-dominant programs administered in any of the
survey versions.
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APPENDIX B
EXPLANATION OF VARIABLES USED
Explanation of Variables Used
Plan: Management plan required is a 1; not required is a 0.
Time: Time commitment, in years. Takes on values of 5and 10 years.
Rev: Revenue net of costs, in dollars per acre per year. Takes on values of 5, 15, and 30
dollars per acre per year.
Pen: Penalty for early withdrawal is a 1; no penalty is a 0.
Acre: Respondent owns 100 acres or more is a 1; fewer than 100 acres is a 0.
Older: Respondent is 66 years or older in age takes a 1; younger than 66 takes a 0.
LowerEd: Respondent’s education level is high school diploma or less takes a 1; some
college or more takes a 0.
HigherEd: Respondent has more than a college degree is a 1; a college degree or less is a
0.
Male: Respondent is male takes a 1; female takes a 0.
Plan*Older: 1 if management plan is required and respondent is 66 years or older; else 0.
Rev*Older: Revenue for respondents 66 and older.
Plan*LowerEd: 1 if management plan is required and respondent has a high school
diploma or less; else 0.
Rev*LowerEd: Revenue for respondents with a high school diploma or less.
Time*Male: Time commitment for males.
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APPENDIX C
CHOICE ELICITATION SECTION OF THE SURVEY
Step 1: Please read the following description of the Michigan Working Forest Carbon
Offset Program:
Michigan Working Forest Carbon Offset Program
Overview

The goal of the Michigan Forest Carbon Offset Program (MFCOP) is to provide
landowners with financial incentives to engage in sustainable forest management, address
climate change, support local natural resource economies and preserve family lands.
The Program allows landowners to generate revenue through the sale of carbon offset
credits on the Chicago Climate Exchange.
The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCE) - a voluntary, member-based market comprised of
large companies, municipalities and institutions - allows carbon sequestration benefits
from conservation practices to be quantified, credited and sold. The credits are pooled
from many different landowners and sold to CCE members who have made a
commitment to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. CCE members must reduce their
emissions to meet legally binding targets or mitigate a portion of their emissions through
the purchase of offset credits generated by eligible practices. The Delta Institute, a nonprofit organization, pools and sells these credits on the CCE on behalf of the landowner.
The revenue from the sale, minus pooling and trading fees, is returned to the landowner.
Landowners who sustainably manage forestlands provide a valuable public service
through carbon sequestration. This rise of carbon credit trading has opened new financial
markets for landowners. However, the complexities and costs to enter these markets are
often a barrier to participation. The Michigan Working Forest Carbon Offset Program
eliminates this barrier to entry, allowing landowners to earn revenue for providing a
valuable ecosystem service.
Step 2: Please rate the options using the instructions below:

Please assume a similar forest carbon offset program will soon be developed in
Massachusetts and complete the following. Please rate each of the following carbon
offset programs on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being programs in which you would
definitely enroll and 1 being programs in which you would definitely not enroll. Please
look over all three of the alternatives before making your ratings. You may use any
particular rating for more than one program if you feel equally about them.
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Eligibility
Time Commitment
Verification

Expected Payment
Early Withdrawal
Penalty

Carbon Credit Program 1
Requires management plan
written by professional forester
5 years
Baseline carbon inventory
calculated by forester; changes
in carbon capacity must be
reported annually
$5/acre/year
$10/acre one time payment

Carbon Credit Program 2
Requires management plan
written by professional forester
5 years

Rating (1 to 10 scale):______

Rating (1 to 10 scale):_____

Eligibility

Baseline carbon inventory
calculated by forester; changes
in carbon capacity must be
reported annually
$30/acre/year
None

Carbon Credit Program 3
Requires management plan written by professional
forester

Time Commitment
Verification

10 years
Baseline carbon inventory calculated by forester;
changes in carbon capacity must be reported annually

Expected Payment
Early Withdrawal Penalty

$15/acre/year
$10/acre one time payment

Rating (1 to 10 scale):______

73

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adamowicz, W., and J. R. DeShazo. 2006. Frontiers in stated preferences methods: an
introduction. Environmental and Resource Economics, 34(1), 1-6.
Aguilera, Ana M., Manuel Escabias, and Mariano J. Valderrama. 2008. Discussion of
different logistic models with functional data. Application to systemic lupus
erythematosus. Computational Statistics and Data Analysis, 53(2008), 151-163.
Alerich, C.L. 2000. “Forest Statistics for Massachusetts: 1985 and 1998.” USDA Forest
Service Resource Bulletin NE-148. Newtown Square, PA: USDA Forest Service.
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong., 1st Sess.
(2009).
American Forest Foundation. 2009. “Family Forests and Climate Change.” Retrieved
June 15, 2009, from American Forest Foundation Web site:
http://www.forestfoundation.org/AFF_FFCC_final.pdf
Bartolucci, Francesco and Alessio Farcomeni. 2009. A multivariate extension of the
dynamic logit model for longitudinal data based on a latent markov heterogeneity
structure. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 104(486), 816-831.
Beach, Robert H., Subhrendu K. Pattanayak, Jui-Chen Yang, Brian C. Murray, and
Robert C. Abt. 2005. Econometric studies of non-industrial private forest
management: a review and synthesis. Forest Policy and Economics 7: 261-281.
Borooah, V. K. 2001. Logit and probit: ordered and multinomial models. Sage
University Papers Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 07138. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Brown, Thomas C., Icek Ajzen, and Daniel Hrubes. 2003. Further tests of entreaties to
avoid hypothetical bias in referendum contingent valuation. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 46 (2003), 353–361.
CarbonTree, LLC. “Questions & Answers.” Retrieved June 25, 2009 from CarbonTree,
LLC Web site: http://www.carbontreellc.com/files/CarbonTreeInformation.pdf
Cason, J.D., D.L. Grebner, A.J. Londo, S.C. Grado. 2006. Potential for carbon storage
and technology transfer in the southeastern United States. Journal of Extension
44(4).
Catanzaro, Paul, Wendy Sweetser, Dave Kittridge, Lisa Romano. “Chapter 61B Open
Space and Recreational Land: Current Tax Use Program.” Retrieved April 4, 2010
from the Trustees of Reservations Website:
http://www.thetrustees.org/hci/library/CH61B_final_1.pdf.

74

Chicago Climate Exchange. 2006. “Chicago Climate Exchange Announces Formation of
the New York Climate Exchange (NYCX) and the Northeast Climate Exchange
(NECX).” Retrieved June 25, 2009, from Chicago Climate Exchange Web site:
http://www.chicagoclimateexchange.com/news/press/release_20060314_NYCX.pdf
Chicago Climate Exchange. 2007. “Chicago Climate Exchange, Inc. (CCX) announces
formation of the California Climate Exchange (CaCX).” Retrieved from Chicago
Climate Exchange Web site:
http://www.chicagoclimateexchange.com/news.jsf?story=1401
Colombo, S., N. Hanley, and J. Louviere. 2009. Modeling preference heterogeneity in
stated choice data: An analysis for public goods generated by agriculture.
Agricultural Economics, 40(3), 307-322.
Congressional Budget Office. 2009. “H.R. 2454 American Clean Energy and Security
Act of 2009: As ordered reported by the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce on May 21, 2009.
Cooke, Thomas J. and Karen Speirs. 2005. Migration and employment among the civilian
spouses of military personnel. Social Science Quarterly, 86(2), 343-355.
“Copenhagen climate deal meets qualified UN welcome.” Saturday December 19, 2010.
Retrieved April 4, 2010, from the BBC website:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8422133.stm
Craiu, Radu V., Thierry Duchesne, and Daniel Fortin. 2008. Inference methods for the
conditional logistic regression model with longitudinal data. Biometrical Journal,
50(1), 97-109.
Delta Institute. “The Michigan Working Forest Carbon Offset Program.” Retrieved June
20, 2009, from Southern Regional Extension Forestry Web site:
http://www.sref.info/news_items/Forest%20carbon%20brochure.pdf
DeShazo, J. R., T. A. Cameron, and M. Saenz. 2009. The effect of consumers' real-world
choice sets on inferences from stated preference surveys. Environmental and
Resource Economics, 42(3), 319-343.
DeShazo, J. R., and G. Fermo. 2002. Designing choice sets for stated preference
methods: The effects of complexity on choice consistency. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 44(1), 123-143.
Dillman, Don A. 2009. Internet, mail, and mixed-mode surveys : the tailored design
method. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons.
Environmental Protection Agency. 2009. “EPA Economic Analysis of ‘the American
Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009.’” Retrieved from Environmental Protection
Agency Web site: http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/economics/pdfs/WMAnalysis.pdf.
75

Farnsworth, David, ChristinaPalmero, Christopher Sherry. 2007. “Potential Emissions
Leakage and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI): Evaluating Market
Dynamics, Monitoring Options, and Possible Mitigation Mechanisms.” Initial
Report of the RGGI Emissions Leakage Multi-State Staff WorkingGroup to the
RGGI Agency Heads, March 14, 2007. Retrieved April 4, 2010, from the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative Website:
http://www.rggi.org/docs/il_report_final_3_14_07.pdf .
Finley, A.O. and D.B. Kittridge. 2006. Thoreau, Muir and Jane Doe: different types of
private forest owners need different kinds of forest management. Northern Journal
of Applied Forestry 23(1): 27-34.
Fletcher, L.S., D. Kittridge, Jr., T. Stevens. 2009. Forest landowners’ willingness to sell
carbon credits: a pilot study. Northern Journal of Applied Forestry 26(1), 35-37.
Hamilton, Katherine, Milo Sjardin, Thomas Marcello, Gordon Xu. 2008. “Forging a
Frontier: State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets in 2008.” Retrieved June 20, 2009,
from Ecosystem Marketplace Web site:
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/documents/cms_documents/2008_StateofVo
luntaryCarbonMarket2.pdf
Hedeker, D. 2005. “Generalized Linear Mixed Models.” In B. Everitt and D. Howell
(Eds.), Encyclopedia of Statistics in Behavioral Science. Wiley.
Hedeker, D. 2007. “Multiple Models for Ordinal and Nominal Variables.” In Jan de
Leeuw and Erik Meijer (Eds.), Handbook of Multilevel Analysis. Springer, New
York.
Hedeker, D. and R. D. Gibbons. 2006. Longitudinal Data Analysis. Wiley.
Henscher, David A., Jordan J. Louviere, and Joffre Swait. 2000. Stated choice methods :
analysis & application. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hess, Stephane and John M. Rose. 2009. Allowing for intra-respondent variations in
coefficients estimated on repeated choice data. Transportation Research Part B,
43(2009), 708-719.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2007). “Climate Change 2007: Synthesis
Report.” Retrieved June 25, 2009, from Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
Web Site:
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_rep
ort_synthesis_report.htm
Jaquemet, Nicolas, Robert-Vincent Joule, Stephane Luchini, and Jason Shogren. 2009.
Preference elicitation under oath. EconPapers Working Paper. Retrieved August 20,
2009, from ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2009/09043.pdf

76

Kline, J.D., R.J. Alig, R.L. Johnson. 2000. Forest owner incentives to protect riparian
habitat. Ecological Economics 33, 29-34
Klugman, Joshua and Jun Xu. 2008. Racial differences in public confidence in education:
1974-2002. Social Science Quarterly, 89(1), 155-176.
Kolmuss, Anja, Helge Zink, Clifford Polycarp. 2008. “Making Sense of the Voluntary
Carbon Market: a Comparison of Carbon Offset Standards.” Retrieved June 25,
2009, from WWF Web site: http://assets.panda.org/downloads/vcm_report_final.pdf
Kropko, J. 2008. Choosing between multinomial logit and multinomial probit models for
analysis of unordered choice data" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
MPSA Annual National Conference, Palmer House Hotel, Hilton, Chicago, IL
Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2010-03-12 from
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p265696_index.html
Kuuluvainen, J., H. Karppinen, Ovaskainen. 1996. Landowner objectives and
nonindustrial private timber supply. Forest Science 42(3), 300-309.
Layton, D. F., and S. T. Lee. 2006. Embracing model uncertainty: Strategies for response
pooling and model averaging. Environmental and Resource Economics, 34(1), 5185.
Layton, D. F., and S.T. Lee, S. T. 2006. From ratings to rankings: the econometric
analysis of stated preference ratings data. Explorations in Environmental and
Natural Resource Economics: Essays in Honor of Gardner M. Brown, Jr., 224-.
LeVert, M., T. Stevens and D. Kittredge. Forthcoming. Willingness to sell conservation
easements. Journal of Forest Economics. (In Press).
Liao, T. F. 1994. Interpreting probability models: logit, probit, and other generalized
linear models. Sage University Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in the
Social Sciences, 07-101. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Long, J.S., J. Freese. 2001. Regression models for categorical dependent variables using
stata. Stata Press, College Station, Texas.
Meyerhoff, J., U. Liebe, and V. Hartje. 2009. Benefits of biodiversity enhancement of
nature-oriented silviculture: Evidence from two choice experiments in Germany.
Journal of Forest Economics, 15(1-2), 37-58.
Moon, Amanda. 2004. Assessing the impacts of complexity in stated preference methods.
M.Sc. thesis, University of Alberta, Edmonton.
Murphy, James J. and Thomas H. Stevens. 2004. Contingent valuation, hypothetical bias,
and experimental economics. Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 33/2
(October 2004): 182-192

77

Murphy, James J., Geoffrey Allen, Thomas H. Stevens, and Darryl Weatherhead. 2005.
A meta-analysis of hypothetical bias in stated preference valuation. Environmental
and Resource Economics 30, 313–325.
Nickerson, John. 2008. “CCAR Forest Protocols.” [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved June
15, 2009 from Northern California Society of American Foresters Web site:
http://www.norcalsaf.org/temparticles/Nickerson.pdf
Oregon Small Woodlands Association. “Creating Access to Carbon Markets for Family
Woodland Owners.” Retrieved June 20, 2009, from Oregon Small Woodlands
Association Web site: http://www.oswa.org/WoodlandsCarbonInfo2.pdf
Ouwersloot, Hans and Piet Rietveld. 1996. Stated choice experiments with repeated
observations. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 30(2), 203-212.
Perschel, Robert T., Alexander M. Evans, Marcia J. Summers. 2007. “Climate Change,
Carbon, and the Forests of the Northeast.” Forest Guild. Retrieved June 30, 2009,
from Forest Guild Web site:
www.forestguild.org/publications/2007/ForestGuild_climate_carbon_forests.pdf.
Scarpa, R., K. G. Willis, and M. Acutt. 2007. Valuing externalities from water supply:
Status quo, choice complexity and individual random effects in panel kernel logit
analysis of choice experiments. Journal of Environmental Planning and
Management, 50(4), 449-466.
Sheu, Ching-Fan. 2002. Fitting mixed-effects models for repeated ordinal outcomes with
the NLMIXED procedure. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers,
34(2), 151-157.
Stevens, T. H., R. Belkner, D. Dennis, D. Kittredge, C. Willis. 2000. Comparison of
contingent valuation and conjoint analysis in ecosystem management. Ecological
Economics, 32 (2000) 63-74.
“The Potential for Carbon Sequestration on Family Forest Land.” Retrieved March 15,
2010, from the Family Forest Research Center Website:
http://www.familyforestresearchcenter.org/projects/carbon.html
United Nations. 1998. “Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change.” Retrieved June 20, 2009, from United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change Web site:
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php
“U.S. Climate Legislation & Forestry Offsets: Implications for Forest Landowners,
Investors and Regulated Entities.” Retrieved March 29, 2010, from the New Forests
Website: http://www.newforests.com.au/news/pdf/articles/PolicyOctUS.php.

78

von Haefen, R. H., D. M. Massey, and W. L. Adamowicz. 2005. Serial nonparticipation
in repeated discrete choice models. American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
87(4), 1061-1076.
“Voluntary Carbon Standard: Guidance for Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use
Projects.” 2007. Retrieved March 29, 2010, from the Voluntary Carbon Standard
Website: http://www.v-c-s.org/docs/AFOLU%20Guidance%20Document.pdf.
“WCI Recommendations for Implementing the Offset Limit.” March 11, 2010. Retrived
March 29, 2010, from the Western Climate Initiative Website:
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/component/remository/func-startdown/224/.
Yen, Steven T., R. Morris Coats, and Thomas R. Dalton. 2001. Brand name investment
of candidates and district homogeneity: an ordinal response model. Southern
Economic Journal, 58(4), 988-1001.

79

